Talmud - Temurah 23a תמורה כ״ג א׳

All concede, even the Rabbis, that if the owner did not consult the court about which animal to sacrifice, but instead he took one of the animals and sacrificed it, he has demonstrated a lack of concern for the fate of the remaining animal, and that therefore the second animal is left to die. Consequently, you find that both clauses of the mishna are consistent with the opinion of the Rabbis, as one may interpret the latter clause as referring to a case where the owner took one of the two sums of money, used it to purchase an animal, and sacrificed the animal, and in such a case, all agree that the other sum of money is cast into the Dead Sea.

But according to that which Rabbi Abba says that Rav says, the mishna cannot be interpreted in this manner. As Rabbi Abba said: All concede that in a case where one achieves atonement through the one that was not lost, the one that was lost is left to die. With regard to what case do the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree? They disagree with regard to the case of one who achieves atonement with the one that was lost. As Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that if one designates a sin offering instead of one that was lost, it is considered like the lost sin offering. Accordingly, just as the lost animal is left to die if the second sin offering was sacrificed, the replacement animal is left to die if the original animal was sacrificed. And the Rabbis hold that if one designates a sin offering instead of one that was lost, it is not considered like the lost animal. Rather, if the original animal is sacrificed, the replacement animal is left to graze, as it was never lost.

Therefore, one must say that according to this explanation, the tanna taught us the first clause of the mishna in an unattributed manner in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and he taught us the latter clause in an unattributed manner in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

The Gemara asks: And what is the tanna teaching us by teaching its clauses in accordance with different opinions? Presumably, he is teaching us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree about this matter. But the tanna already teaches the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis explicitly in the latter clause: In the case of one who designates his sin offering and the animal was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and thereafter the first sin offering was found, and both of the animals stand fit for sacrifice, one of them shall be sacrificed and the other shall be left to die; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: A sin offering is not left to die unless it was found after its owner achieved atonement; and the money is not taken to the Dead Sea unless it was found after its owner achieved atonement.

The Gemara answers: This is what the tanna is teaching us in the latter clause, that this matter that was presented in a contradictory manner between the first and second clauses of the mishna is actually a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis.

§ The Gemara returns to the matter itself, which was cited above: Rav Huna says that Rav says: All concede that if the owner did not consult the court about which animal to sacrifice but instead took one of the animals and sacrificed it, the second animal is left to die. They disagree only in a case where the owner comes to consult the court. As Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: The Sages did not care to enact a protective ordinance with regard to consecrated items, and it was of no concern to them that one of the animals would be left to die. And therefore, we say to the owner: Go achieve atonement with the sin offering that was not lost, and the one that was lost shall be left to die. And the Rabbis hold: The Sages enacted a protective ordinance with regard to consecrated items, and we therefore say to the owner: Go achieve atonement with the sin offering that was lost, and the one that was not lost shall be left to graze.

Rav Mesharshiyya raises an objection: And is there such an opinion that the Sages did not care to enact a protective ordinance with regard to consecrated items, to prevent them from being left to die? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to a verse that deals with the remainder of a meal offering: “And that which is left thereof shall Aaron and his sons eat; it shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place; in the court of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:9). Why must the verse state at the end the apparently redundant expression: “They shall eat”? The verse teaches that if the remainder constitutes a small amount for consumption, the priests eat non-sacred food and teruma with it, so that the remainder will be eaten while satiated.

Furthermore, why must the verse state: “They shall eat it”? The verse teaches that if the remainder constitutes a large amount for consumption, e.g., there are many remainders from the meal offerings, then one does not eat non-sacred food or teruma with it, so that it will not be eaten in an excessive manner. Otherwise, one might fail to consume the entire remainder, and some of it would be rendered leftover from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption [notar].

Rav Mesharshiyya concludes his objection: This baraita teaches that an ordinance was enacted in order to prevent the remainder of a meal offering from being rendered notar. The same reasoning should apply to other consecrated items, including a sin offering. What, is it not that this baraita is stated even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? The Gemara responds: No, this baraita is stated specifically according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

And Rabbi Abba says that Rav says: All concede that in a case where one achieves atonement through the one that was not lost, the one that was lost is left to die. With regard to what case do the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where one achieves atonement with the one that was lost. As Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that if one designates a sin offering instead of one that was lost, it is considered like the lost sin offering. Therefore, the second animal is left to die. And the Rabbis hold that if one designates a sin offering instead of one that was lost, it is not considered like the lost animal. Accordingly, the second animal is left to graze.

The Gemara objects to the explanation of Rabbi Abba in the name of Rav: We learned in a mishna (Yoma 62a): On Yom Kippur, a pair of goats is brought to the Temple, where lots are drawn to determine which goat is sent to Azazel as the scapegoat, and which goat is sacrificed as a sin offering. If the scapegoat died after the lots were drawn for both goats, another pair of goats is brought and lots are drawn for the second pair. This means that there are two goats that were selected as the sin offering, i.e., the remaining goat from the first pair and the goat selected from the second pair. One of these is sacrificed; and the second goat shall graze until it becomes blemished, and it shall then be sold, and the money received from its sale will be allocated for communal gift offerings. This is because a communal sin offering is not left to die. One may infer from the mishna that under similar circumstances, the sin offering of an individual is left to die.

The Gemara continues its objection: And Rav says with regard to this mishna: Living animals are not rejected. In other words, the sin offering from the first pair is not disqualified on account of the death of the first scapegoat. And therefore, when he achieves atonement, he may even achieve atonement with the second goat of the first pair. And the other sin offering from the latter pair is like an animal designated instead of an offering that was lost, as the second pair was brought due to the death of the first scapegoat. And the mishna states that the reason the remaining sin offering is not left to die is that it is a communal sin offering, but if it were the sin offering of an individual, it would be left to die.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Temura 23a explores whether a replacement sin offering must be left to die or may graze, debating the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's differing views.