Talmud - Horayot 3a הוריות ג׳ א׳

“This is the law of the burnt-offering, it is that which goes up on its pyre on the altar” (Leviticus 6:2); these are three exclusionary terms: “This,” “the burnt-offering,” and “it is,” which serve to exclude three offerings concerning which the halakha is that even if they are placed on the altar they are subsequently removed: A burnt-offering slaughtered at night, a burnt-offering whose blood was spilled before it was sprinkled, and a burnt-offering whose blood was taken outside the courtyard. Apparently, it is Rabbi Yehuda who interprets multiple exclusionary terms.

And if you wish, say that proof for the attribution of the baraitot may be cited from the second baraita, which begins with the phrase: Still I say. You cannot interpret that baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as the baraita teaches: One might have thought that each member of a majority of the congregation that sinned based on the ruling of a court is exempt from liability to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of their transgression. And if this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t he say: It is the congregation that brings the bull as an offering, and not the court? As we learned in a mishna (5a) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Seven tribes that sinned bring seven bulls. The tribes bring the offerings, not the court.

§ Up to this point, the Gemara explained the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and contrary to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him. And Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: The mishna is the statement of Rabbi Meir, but the Rabbis say: An individual who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Rabbi Meir and what is the opinion of the Rabbis to which Shmuel referred? It is as it is taught in a baraita: If the court issued a ruling and the judges performed a transgression on the basis of that ruling, Rabbi Meir deems them exempt and the Rabbis deem them liable.

The Gemara asks: Who performed the transgression? If we say that it is the members of the court who performed the transgression, what is the reasoning of the Rabbis, who deem him liable? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that if the court issued a ruling and the members of the court performed the transgression, one might have thought they would be liable to bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin. The verse states with regard to that bull: “And the matter is hidden from the eyes of the congregation and they performed” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that the action is dependent on the congregation and the ruling is dependent on the court.

Rather, the case in the baraita is where the court issued a ruling and the majority of the congregation performed a transgression on the basis of that ruling. If so, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir, who deems them exempt? Rather, is it not referring to a case where the court issued a ruling and a minority of the congregation performed a transgression on the basis of that ruling, and it is with regard to this matter that the tanna’im disagree: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds: An individual who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds: An individual who performed a transgression on the basis of a ruling of the court is liable. The mishna, which states that an individual who performs a transgression on the basis of a ruling of the court is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

Rav Pappa said: There is no proof that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis relates to the mishna, as their dispute can be understood differently. Perhaps everyone agrees that an individual who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt. Rather, the tanna’im disagree with regard to whether the members of the court combine with the members of the congregation to complete a majority of the congregation. The members of the congregation who sinned constitute less than a majority. When the judges of the court who sinned are added to that minority, the total of people who sinned constitute a majority.

He explains: One Sage, the Rabbis, holds: The members of the court combine with the members of the congregation to complete a majority of the congregation. And one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds: The members of the court do not combine with the members of the congregation to complete a majority of the congregation; therefore, those who sinned on the basis of the ruling of the court constitute less than a majority and the court is exempt from liability to bring an offering. The mishna is not only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as in the case of the mishna, but even the Rabbis agree.

And if you wish, say instead that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is in a case where the court issued a ruling and a majority of the congregation performed a transgression on the basis of that ruling, and everyone agrees that the court is liable to bring a bull as an offering for an unwitting communal sin. Rabbi Meir deems the members of the congregation exempt from bringing an offering. And who are the Rabbis who deem them liable to bring an offering? It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: The congregation brings an offering and the court brings an offering.

And if you wish, say instead that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is in the case of a tribe that performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of its tribal court. Rabbi Meir holds that there is no liability to bring a bull as an offering for an unwitting communal sin for a ruling issued by a tribal court; therefore, he deems the court exempt from bringing an offering. And who are the Rabbis who deem the tribal court liable to bring an offering? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a tribe that performed a transgression on the basis of a ruling of its tribal court, that tribe is liable.

And if you wish, say instead that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is in a case where six of the twelve tribes sinned and, although they do not constitute a majority of the number of the tribes, in terms of population they constitute a majority of the congregation. Or seven tribes sinned, and even though in terms of population they are not a majority of the congregation, they constitute a majority of the tribes. And whose opinion is expressed in the baraita as the opinion of the Rabbis? It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If six tribes sinned and in terms of population they are a majority of the congregation, or if seven tribes sinned even though in terms of population they are not a majority of the congregation, they are liable. All these alternative understandings of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis lead to the conclusion that there is no proof for the statement of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

§ Rav Asi says: And with regard to the definition of the majority that establishes liability for performance of a transgression on the basis of the ruling of a court, follow the majority of the residents of Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “And Solomon held the feast at that time, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt, before the Lord our God, seven days and seven days, fourteen days” (I Kings 8:65). The Gemara clarifies the words of this verse: Since it is written: “And all Israel with him,” why do I need to add: “A great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt”? Conclude from it: It is these residents of Eretz Yisrael who are characterized as a congregation; but those who reside outside Eretz Yisrael are not characterized as a congregation.

§ The Gemara continues defining the majority that establishes liability. It is obvious that the case of when those who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court were numerous, i.e., they constituted a majority, and their percentage diminished, e.g., if some sinners died and they now constitute a minority of the congregation; that is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, who disagree in a mishna (10b) with regard to an anointed High Priest or a king who performed an unwitting transgression before assuming his position. The Rabbis hold: Since they were laymen when they sinned, they are liable to bring the offering of a layman. Rabbi Shimon holds: If they became aware of their transgression while still laymen, they bring the offering of a layman. If they became aware of their transgression after they assumed their positions, they are exempt. Accordingly, in the case of a majority whose number diminished, the Rabbis hold that since it was a majority that sinned, they bring an offering. Rabbi Shimon holds that it depends on their status when they became aware they had unwittingly sinned.

If those who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court were few, i.e., they constituted a minority, and their percentage increased, e.g., if some non-sinners died and the sinners now constitute a majority of the congregation, what is the halakha? Do Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this matter as well? That would mean that Rabbi Shimon, who follows the status at the time of awareness, deems the court liable, and the Rabbis, who follow the status at the time of the transgression, deem the court exempt. Or do they not disagree? What is the conclusion?

And can you understand that this case is contingent on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis? Say that you heard that Rabbi Shimon follows the status at the time of awareness as well, i.e., in a case where both the awareness and the transgression were in a period of liability, either liability as a layman or liability as a king or as an anointed High Priest, the sinner is liable to bring an offering. But in a case where the awareness was during a period of liability, but the transgression was not, did you hear Rabbi Shimon say the court is liable?

The Gemara clarifies: As, if it is so that Rabbi Shimon holds that the period of awareness is the sole determining factor, let the High Priest and the king bring an offering according to their present status. If they became aware of the transgression after assuming their positions, let them bring the offering appropriate for a High Priest or a king. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon say that in that case they are exempt? Rather, apparently Rabbi Shimon requires that both the transgression and the awareness take place in a period of liability. There is no resolution for the dilemma that was raised.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the court issued a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and a minority of the congregation performed the transgression of eating forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling, and the court reversed their decision and then reversed their decision again and issued a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and a different minority of the congregation performed the transgression, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Is it that since there are two disparate experiences of awareness, the first minority does not combine with the second minority, even though the two minorities together would constitute a majority? Or perhaps, since both this transgression and that transgression are the same, eating forbidden fat, the first minority combines with the second minority, and the two minorities together constitute a majority.

And if you say in that case: Since both this transgression and that transgression are the same, eating forbidden fat, the first minority combines with the second minority, then there is another dilemma: In a case where a minority performed a transgression on the basis of the first ruling of the court and ate forbidden fat that is upon the maw, and a minority performed a transgression on the basis of the second ruling of the court and ate forbidden fat that is upon the small intestine, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Here, certainly, since these transgressions come from two different verses, the first minority does not combine with the second minority; or perhaps, since both this transgression and that transgression are the same, eating forbidden fat, the first minority combines with the second minority, and the two minorities together constitute a majority.

And if you say in that case: It is the name of forbidden fat that they both have in common, and the first minority combines with the second minority, then there is another dilemma: In a case where a minority performed a transgression on the basis of the first ruling of the court and ate forbidden fat, and a minority performed a transgression on the basis of the second ruling of the court and ate forbidden blood, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Here, certainly, they are two distinct prohibitions, and since the nature of their prohibition is not identical, the first minority does not combine with the second minority. Or perhaps, since their offerings are identical, as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting violation of either of these prohibitions, the first minority combines with the second minority.

And if you say in that case: Since their offerings are identical, the first minority combines with the second minority, then there is another dilemma: In a case where a minority performed a transgression on the basis of the first ruling of the court and ate forbidden fat, and a minority performed a transgression on the basis of the second ruling of the court and engaged in idol worship, what is the halakha? Here, certainly, neither are their prohibitions identical nor are their offerings identical, because an individual who unwittingly engages in idol worship may bring only a female goat for atonement. Therefore, the first minority does not combine with the second minority. Or perhaps, since for both this transgression and that transgression one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] if he performs it intentionally, the first minority combines with the second minority. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the court issued a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and a minority of the congregation performed the transgression of eating forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling, and the members of that court died and another court stood in their place, and again issued the same ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and a different minority performed the transgression of eating forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling, what is the halakha?

The Gemara elaborates: According to the opinion of the one who said that only the court brings the offering, do not raise the dilemma, as those judges who issued the original ruling on the basis of which the minority performed a transgression are no longer alive. Rather, when should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the one who said that the congregation brings the offering. What is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: The congregation exists, as together the two minorities constitute a majority of the congregation who performed the transgression.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Horayot 3a examines which sacrifices are disqualified once removed from the altar and debates whether Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Meir underlies the mishna's ruling on communal error.