Talmud - Horayot 2b הוריות ב׳ ב׳

The Gemara answers: In the latter clause, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: This, and it is unnecessary to say that, i.e., the cases are arranged with each case more obvious than the one that preceded it.

§ The mishna teaches: And one of the judges knew that they erred, or if he was a student and he is qualified to issue halakhic rulings. The Gemara asks: Why do I need two cases? As a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings is the equivalent of one of the judges, why did the tanna mention both? Rava said: It was necessary to state both, as it may enter your mind to say that this statement that he is liable applies specifically to one who is learned and analytical, but that one who is learned but not analytical, no, he should not be liable to bring an offering. Therefore, the tanna cites both the case of a judge and the case of a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, to teach that even one who is learned but not analytical is liable in this case.

Abaye challenged this and said to Rava that the term: A student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, indicates that he is both learned and analytical. Rava said to Abaye: This is what I am saying: If the tanna had taught the halakha from that first halakha with regard to one of the judges, I would say that this statement applies only to one who is both learned and analytical, but if he was learned and not analytical, no, he would not be liable. Therefore, the tanna taught the additional case of a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, and from the extraneous case in the mishna one can infer that the halakha applies even to one who is learned but not analytical or one who is analytical but not yet learned. Since he associates his action with himself, he is liable.

§ The mishna teaches: Qualified to issue halakhic rulings. The Gemara asks: Like whom? Who is an example of one qualified to issue halakhic rulings? Rava said: It is one like Shimon ben Azzai or Shimon ben Zoma, who, although they were among the most outstanding Torah scholars of their generation, were not ordained. Abaye said to Rava: In a case like this, he is an intentional sinner, as a scholar of that caliber would certainly not err. If he ruled that a prohibited action is permitted, it is assumed that he acted with intent, and he is exempt from bringing an offering.

Rava said to Abaye: But according to your reasoning, that which is taught in a baraita that cites the verse: “In performing one” (Leviticus 4:27), from which it is derived that an individual who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression based on the ruling of the court is exempt; how so? When does this apply? If the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and it became known to one of the judges that they erred, or if he was a student who was sitting before them and he is qualified to issue halakhic rulings, e.g., Shimon ben Azzai, might one have thought that he would be exempt? To counter this, the verse states: “In performing one,” from which it is derived that an individual who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt.

Rava continues: Rather, the baraita is difficult; how can you find these circumstances where a judge or a prominent Torah scholar would be considered an unwitting sinner? The Gemara answers: It is in a case where the judge or the scholar knew that the action with regard to which the court issued a ruling that it is permitted is in fact prohibited, but he erred with regard to the mitzva of heeding the statements of the Sages. He believed that there is a mitzva to heed the directives of the Sages even when he is certain that they are mistaken. If so, according to my understanding too, the reference is to one like Shimon ben Azzai or Shimon ben Zoma; it is also a case where they erred with regard to the mitzva of heeding the statements of the Sages. Due to that error, they are liable to bring an offering.

§ The mishna teaches: This is the principle: One who associates his action with himself is liable. The Gemara asks: What case that was not already mentioned in the mishna does this principle serve to include? The Gemara answers: It serves to include one who disdains halakhic rulings in general, treating them with contempt and relying only on his own understanding.

The mishna teaches the second part of that principle: And one who associates his action with the ruling of the court is exempt. The Gemara explains: This principle serves to include an additional case that was not yet mentioned in the mishna, namely, where the court issued a ruling and the judges discovered that they erred and reversed their decision. If one was unaware that the court reversed their decision, and acted based on their initial ruling, he is deemed one who associates his action with the ruling of the court and is exempt. The Gemara challenges: The tanna teaches this halakha explicitly in the next mishna (3b), and consequently there is no need for an allusion in this mishna. The Gemara explains: The tanna teaches it ambiguously, and then teaches it explicitly.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This halakha in the mishna, which states that an individual who performs a transgression on the basis of a ruling issued by the court is exempt from liability to bring an offering, is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis say: An individual who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda to which Shmuel refers? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:27). These are three exclusionary terms: “One,” “unwittingly,” and “in performing,” and one of these exclusions serves to teach that one who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt.

The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of the Rabbis? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Still I say: Each member of a minority of the congregation that sinned based on the ruling of a court is liable to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court does not bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the minority’s transgression. One might have thought that each member of a majority of the congregation that sinned based on the ruling of a court would be exempt from liability to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression. To counter this, the verse states with regard to a sin-offering brought for an unwitting transgression: “From among the common people,” from which it is derived that even members of the majority of the congregation, and even members of the entire congregation, are not exempt because of the ruling of the court.

The Gemara asks: In what circumstances did the majority of the congregation sin? If we say that the reference is to a transgression with unwitting performance of an action unrelated to a ruling of the court, why does the tanna say: As the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression? Given that this is a case where a court did not issue a ruling, what action did the court perform? Since it was not on the basis of the ruling of the court, does the court bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin that was performed not on the basis of its ruling? Rather, the reference in the baraita must be to a case where the majority of the congregation performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court. If so, the question arises: But when it is written with regard to a sin-offering brought for an unwitting transgression: “From among the common people,” it is with regard to a transgression with unwitting performance of an action that it is written.

Rather, is it not that this is what the tanna is saying: The baraita is incomplete and must be taught in this manner: Each member of a minority of the congregation that sinned with unwitting performance of an action is liable to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court does not bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the minority’s transgression in a case where the court issued an erroneous ruling. But a minority of the congregation that sinned unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court is also liable.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that a majority of the congregation that sinned with unwitting performance of an action would be exempt, as the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression in a case where the court issued an erroneous ruling. Therefore, the verse states: “From among the common people,” from which it is derived that even members of the majority of the congregation are liable. If the unwitting transgression was performed not on the basis of the ruling of the court, there is no difference between a minority and a majority of the people. This is proof that according to the Rabbis both an individual and a minority of the congregation who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court are liable.

Rav Pappa said: From where do you draw this conclusion? Perhaps in the case where a minority of the congregation performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court, neither do those individuals bring an offering, because they associated their action with the court, nor does the court bring an offering, because it was only a minority of the congregation that performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court.

The Gemara rejects this: If so, why does the tanna specifically seek a source with regard to the majority for liability? Why did the tanna seek to introduce the halakha that even if a majority of the congregation sinned they would be liable to bring an offering? Can one not, by inference, conclude with regard to a minority that acts on the basis of the ruling of the court, that he holds that they are liable even though they acted on the basis of the ruling of the court? According to Rav Pappa’s opinion, let the tanna first seek to cite proof about a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action, and ultimately seek to cite proof about a majority to establish liability for each of its members to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action, as it has not yet been established with regard to a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action.

Rather, can one not make an inference from the fact that the tanna did not first seek to cite proof about a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action and then seek to cite proof about a majority to establish liability for each of its members to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action? Accordingly, one can conclude from it that it was clear to the tanna that in a case of a minority that acts on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the minority is liable to bring a female lamb or a female goat as a sin-offering, and for unwitting performance of an action not on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the minority is similarly liable.

The Gemara asks: Now, we learned both of the baraitot unattributed. From where may it be ascertained that the tanna of the first baraita is Rabbi Yehuda and the tanna of the latter baraita is the Rabbis? Say the opposite. The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that interprets exclusionary terms in this way? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Horayot 2b explores whether a student capable of ruling on Jewish law must be both learned and analytical to bear liability, citing Shimon ben Azzai as an example.