Talmud - Horayot 8a הוריות ח׳ א׳

The baraita teaches: And they agree that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the provisional guilt-offering: “And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” (Leviticus 5:18). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse, in accordance with their opinions. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: This is referring to one whose sin-offering for all transgressions is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude that anointed priest, as all of his sin-offerings are not for an unwitting act alone; rather, he brings a sin-offering only if that unwitting act is performed on the basis of absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling.

The Gemara asks: Is it written in the verse: For all his unwitting acts that he performed unwittingly? Only the phrase “for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” is written. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is as though the word: All, is written. As if it were so that the verse is not referring to all unwitting acts, let the Torah write only: “For his unwitting act.” Why do I need the additional phrase: “That he performed unwittingly”? This teaches us that there is no liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering unless liability to bring all his sin-offerings is for unwitting acts. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, all of whose liability to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting act alone is only in cases of idol worship, but in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot there is liability only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.

And the Rabbis interpret the verse in accordance with their opinion that an anointed priest, even in cases of idol worship, brings a sin-offering only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. They hold: This teaches us that there is liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering only for one whose liability to bring his sin-offerings is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose liability to bring a sin-offering is not for an unwitting act alone, neither in cases of idol worship, nor in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot, but rather for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.

MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring an offering for absence of awareness of the matter unless they issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And likewise the anointed priest is liable only for such a ruling. Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha?

The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The word “that” is stated here in the verse: “And the sin that they sinned” (Leviticus 4:14), with regard to the offering brought by the court for the transgression of the public based on their erroneous ruling, and the word “that” is stated there in the verse: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, that is in her lifetime” (Leviticus 18:18), with regard to the prohibition against marrying two sisters. It is derived: Just as there it is a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the reference is to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling. From where do we derive that this is the halakha for an anointed priest? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the verse: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the transgression of the general public.

The Gemara asks: From where is it derived that this is the halakha with regard to the king? The Gemara answers: The tanna derives a verbal analogy between the term “commandments” written with regard to a king and the term “commandments” written with regard to the general public. It is written with regard to a king: “And he performed one of all the commandments of the Lord his God that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:22), and it is written with regard to the general public: “And performed one of all the commandments of the Lord that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as with regard to the general public there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, in the case of a king there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

The Gemara asks further: From where is it derived that an individual is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: The verse with regard to an individual states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:27). The verse begins with the conjunction “and,” represented by the letter vav. This indicates that one shall derive the halakha with regard to the lower verse, i.e., the verse written later in the passage, from that which is written in the upper verses, i.e., those written earlier. Just as in those verses earlier in the passage, addressing the public, priest, and king, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, so too, in the case of the individual addressed in this verse, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet.

§ The mishna teaches: Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: In the case of idol worship, from where do we derive this halakha? It is derived as the Sages taught: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the priest would be liable even if it is not for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

The baraita continues: Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

The baraita concludes: We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling; but from where do we derive that this is the halakha for an individual, a king, and an anointed priest who engage in idol worship? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if one soul sins unwittingly, then he shall offer a female goat of the first year as a sin-offering” (Numbers 15:27). And with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, they all are included in the category of “one soul.” And one shall derive the halakha with regard to that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verses concerning an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, from that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the transgression of the general public.

The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the one who derives the halakha by using the term “that” for a verbal analogy to teach that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, in accordance with that which we stated. But according to the Rabbis, who derive the halakha by using the term “that” to teach the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden and rival wives with regard to a yevama (see Yevamot 3b), from where do they derive the halakha of a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering in the case of the transgression of the general public?

The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught to his son based on the verse: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30). The Sages understood the phrase “with an upraised hand” to be referring to idol worship (see Sanhedrin 99a). The entire Torah is juxtaposed to idol worship: Just as idol worship is a prohibition for which one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering, so too here, for the entire Torah one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering.

The Gemara challenges: We found a source for this halakha with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, both with regard to idol worship and with regard to the rest of the mitzvot, as all those are included in the category of “one soul” and are juxtaposed to idol worship. But from where do we derive that the general public is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: One derives the halakha with regard to that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the general public, from that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verse concerning an individual.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who derives this matter from the term “that,” what does he do with this verse, from which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught a halakha to his son? The Gemara answers: He derives a halakha, using the verse to teach that which is taught in a baraita: Due to the fact that we found that the verse distinguished with regard to idol worship between the many, who constitute the majority of a city, and individuals, as the many are executed through beheading with a sword and their property is lost, as the court destroys it, while individuals are executed through stoning and their property is spared, one might have thought that in the case of unwitting idol worship we would distinguish between the offerings that they are liable to bring. Therefore, the verse states: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord” (Numbers 15:29–30).

Rav Ḥilkiya of Hagronya objects to it: The reason that both individuals and the general public are liable to bring the same offering for unwitting idol worship is that the verse did not distinguish between them. But had the verse distinguished between them, I would say: Let us distinguish between individuals and the general public, and the general public would bring a different offering for their unwitting idol worship. What different offering shall they bring?

If one would say: Let them bring a bull, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that the general public brings a bull. If one would say: Let them bring a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting idol worship that the general public brings those offerings in the case of an absence of awareness leading to an erroneous ruling by the court. If one would say: Let them bring a goat, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that a king brings a goat. If one will say: Let them bring a female goat, that is difficult, as that is the offering for an individual, too.

The Gemara rejects this: Why do you say that the verse that equates the offerings of the individuals and the public is not necessary? Were it not for the verse, it might enter your mind to say: The general public brings a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, but this majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship shall bring the opposite: A bull for a sin-offering and a goat for a burnt-offering. Alternatively, perhaps the majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship must bring an offering, but it has no remedy, because there is no unique offering that it can bring. Therefore, the verse teaches us that there is no distinction between many people and individuals in this case.

§ In any event, everyone agrees that where these verses are written, it is with regard to idol worship that they are written. The Gemara asks: As the verse does not mention idol worship explicitly, from where is this inferred? Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said, and some say that the statement is unattributed, that the verse states: “And when you act unwittingly, and do not perform all these commandments [kol hamitzvot] that the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). Which is the mitzva that is the equivalent of all the mitzvot? You must say: It is the prohibition against idol worship.

The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that the verse states: “That the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22), and it is written: “That the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses” (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was introduced in the speech of the Holy One, Blessed be He, heard by the Jewish people, and which He commanded in the Torah by means of Moses? You must say: This is idol worship, as Rabbi Yishmael taught concerning the first two commandments: “I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:3): We, the Jewish people, heard them from the mouth of the Almighty.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Horayot 8a examines why an anointed priest is exempt from a provisional guilt-offering, exploring scriptural derivation and rabbinic debate over unwitting sins.