Talmud - Horayot 9a הוריות ט׳ א׳

“And if his means suffice not” (Leviticus 5:7), and it is stated: “And if his means not suffice” (Leviticus 5:11), indicating that the sliding-scale offering applies only to one who can come to a state of poverty and wealth. This serves to exclude a king and an anointed priest, who cannot come to a state of poverty.

The king cannot become poor, as it is written concerning him: “And he performed one of all the mitzvot of the Lord his God” (Leviticus 4:22), referring to the king as one who has only the Lord his God upon him. He is greater than the entire nation and is not a poor person dependent on others. An anointed priest cannot become poor, as it is written: “And the priest that is greatest among his brethren” (Leviticus 21:10), meaning that he is greater than his brethren in beauty, in power, in wisdom, and in wealth, not a poor person. Others say: From where is it derived that if the High Priest does not have personal wealth, one should make him great from the property of his brethren? The verse states: “And the priest that is greatest among his brethren upon whose head the anointing oil is poured” (Leviticus 21:10), from which it is derived: Make him great from the property of his brethren, who will provide him with enough property to render him wealthy.

Ravina raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: In the case of a king who was afflicted with leprosy and unfit to serve as king during his affliction, what is his status with regard to the sliding-scale offering? Previously, during his reign, was he completely eliminated from the obligation to bring a sliding-scale offering to the extent that even now, when he is no longer king, he remains exempt? Or was he merely exempted, so that now that he is no longer king he is obligated to bring the offering? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Ravina: Does he bring the offering from your property, i.e., public property, or does he bring the offering from his personal treasure [degazza]? Since he obviously would bring the offering from his own personal treasure, he remains exempt from bringing the offering.

§ It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: An anointed priest is exempt from bringing an offering in all the cases where one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? It is as the verse states: “This is the offering of Aaron and of his sons that they shall offer unto the Lord on the day that he is anointed: One-tenth part of an ephah of fine flour as a meal-offering” (Leviticus 6:13). One can infer: It is this tenth of an ephah that comes as an obligation for him, and no other such offering comes as an obligation for him.

The Gemara asks: But why not say that when the Merciful One excludes an anointed priest, it is particularly from the type of sliding-scale offering brought due to extreme poverty? And what is it? The one-tenth of an ephah meal-offering mentioned in the verse. But the Merciful One did not exclude him from the dove brought as a sliding-scale offering due to poverty and the sheep brought as a sliding-scale offering by one with wealth. The Gemara rejects this: That should not enter your mind, as it is written with regard to the sliding-scale offering: “And the priest shall atone for him for his sin that he has committed from one of these” (Leviticus 5:13), from which it is derived: One who gains atonement with every one of the types of a sliding-scale offering gains atonement with any of the types of the sliding-scale offering, and one who does not gain atonement with every one of the types of a sliding-scale offering does not gain atonement with any of the types of the sliding-scale offering.

The Gemara asks: But if that is so, and the verse is interpreted in that manner, then that which is written there: “And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters” (Leviticus 5:5), so too shall be interpreted: Anyone who becomes liable in every one of the instances for which one brings a sliding-scale offering can become liable in any of those instances, and anyone who does not become liable in every one of the instances to bring a sliding-scale offering cannot become liable in any of those instances. Why, then, did we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva says: The king is liable in all of these cases except for the case of hearing of a voice, indicating that he can become liable in the rest of the instances even if he is exempt in one?

Abaye and Rava both say to resolve this difficulty: Rabbi Akiva learns this inference from the term: “From one” (Leviticus 5:13). He does not learn anything from the term: “Of one” (Leviticus 5:5). The Gemara asks: And what is different about the term “from one” that he learns a halakha from it?

The Gemara answers: The difference is that the Merciful One wrote it at the end of the passage discussing the sliding-scale offering, with regard to the one-tenth of an ephah meal-offering, to say that anyone who can become liable to bring the one-tenth of an ephah can become liable to bring any of them. As, if it enters your mind to say that one can become liable to bring one even though he cannot become liable to bring any one of them, let the Torah write this phrase: From one of these, with regard to the offering brought due to poverty, or alternatively, with regard to the offering brought by one with wealth. Since this term does not appear with regard to one of the other offerings, apparently, it is specifically with regard to the offering brought due to extreme poverty that one who cannot become liable for that offering is exempt from the entire matter.

MISHNA: In summation: For all mitzvot that are in the Torah for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, the individual brings a ewe or female goat for their unwitting transgression, and the king brings a male goat for their unwitting transgression, and an anointed priest and a court who issued an erroneous ruling bring a bull. And for unwittingly engaging in idol worship, the individual, and the king, and the anointed priest bring a female goat, and the court brings a bull and a goat: A bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering.

With regard to a provisional guilt-offering, the individual and the king are liable, and an anointed priest and a court are exempt. With regard to a definite guilt-offering, the individual, the king, and the anointed priest are liable, and a court is exempt.

For hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony, and for a false oath on an utterance of the lips, and for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, a court is exempt, and the individual, the king, and the anointed priest are liable. But an anointed High Priest is not liable for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And what offering are they liable to bring? It is a sliding-scale offering based on their financial circumstances, as delineated in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:1–13). Rabbi Eliezer says: The king brings a goat.

GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon would posit a principle: For any case in which the individual is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering, the status of the king is like that of the individual, and an anointed priest and a court are exempt. And for any case in which an individual is liable to bring a definite guilt-offering, the status of a king and an anointed priest is like that of the individual, and the court is exempt.

He continues: For hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony, and for a false oath on an utterance of the lips, and for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, a court is exempt, and a king and an anointed priest are liable. But the king is not liable in a case of hearing of a voice, and an anointed priest is not liable for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. In general, for any case for which an individual is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, the status of a king is like that of the individual, and an anointed priest and a court are exempt.

The Gemara expresses surprise: This baraita itself is difficult. You said that an anointed priest is not liable for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and by inference: It is for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods that he is exempt, but he is liable for hearing of a voice and for a statement of the lips. Say the latter clause of the baraita: For any case for which an individual is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, the status of a king is like that of the individual, and an anointed priest and a court are exempt. He teaches: An anointed priest and a court are exempt; just as a court is exempt from all of the sliding-scale offerings, so too, an anointed priest is exempt from all of them, not only from the offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Horayot 9a examines why kings and anointed priests are exempt from the sliding-scale sin offering, plus a dilemma about a leprous king's altered status.