Talmud - Kiddushin 57b קידושין נ״ז ב׳

the cases of an animal set aside as an offering to an idol, and an animal that was itself worshipped as an idol, which are living creatures and yet are permanently forbidden. The Gemara answers: There is a difference, as when they are forbidden, they are forbidden only to be used for the Most High, i.e., to be used as offerings in the Temple service, but it is permitted for a common Jew to derive benefit from them.

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan: But an animal that copulated with a woman, and an animal that copulated with a man, in the presence of witnesses, they are living creatures and yet they are permanently forbidden, as the halakha is that these animals are killed, and one is prohibited from deriving benefit from them once they have been sentenced. Rather, the above explanation should be emended to say: Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: We have not found most kosher living creatures that are permanently forbidden while they are still alive, and it can be assumed that the inclusion of the verse is referring to that which is generally forbidden, even if there are exceptions.

The Gemara offers another answer to the question of how the baraita knew which bird the verse is permitting. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states: “And shall let go the living bird into the open field” (Leviticus 14:7), which indicates that the bird is like a field: Just as a field is permitted, so too, this bird is also permitted. The Gemara asks: Is that word “field” coming to teach this? That word is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The word “field” teaches that one may not stand in Jaffa and throw the bird that is set free to the sea, or stand in Gevat and throw it to the desert, and that he may not stand outside the city and throw it inside the city. Rather, any manner in which he is standing in the city and throws it outside the wall to the field is valid. The word “field” teaches that one must set it free only to the field and nowhere else, not to teach that the bird is permitted.

And the other tanna, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who derives that one is permitted to derive benefit from the bird based on the word “field,” replies: If so, that this was the only halakha the word is teaching, let the Torah write “field”; what is the significance of “the field”? Conclude two conclusions from it, i.e., both the place to throw the bird and the permission to derive benefit.

Rava says a different answer to the question of how the baraita knew which bird the verse is permitting: The Torah did not say “let go” for it to serve as a stumbling block. If the bird sent free was forbidden, the Torah would not have commanded him to send it away, since people might eat it unwittingly.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with a nazirite’s hair, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a nazirite’s hair? The Gemara answers: As the verse states with regard to a nazirite: “He shall be holy [kadosh], he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long” (Numbers 6:5), which teaches: His hair growth shall be holy.

The Gemara asks: If the hair of a nazirite can be compared to consecrated property by use of the term “holy,” then just as with regard to consecrated property, it transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and it becomes desacralized, so too, a nazirite’s hair should transfer its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and the hair itself should become desacralized. This is not the halakha. The Gemara answers: Do we read holy [kodesh] in this verse, which is the term the verse uses for a consecrated item (see Leviticus 22:14)? We read “holy [kadosh].” Since a different conjugation of the term is used, the halakhot of the hair of a nazirite are not derived from those of consecrated property.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey, she is not betrothed. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn donkey, deriving benefit from it is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits it. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The mishna can be referring to one who betrothed a woman with a firstborn donkey after it has had its neck broken, and everyone agrees that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey once its neck is broken.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with meat cooked in milk, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from meat cooked in milk? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The Torah states three times: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19; Exodus 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21). One verse serves to teach the prohibition against eating meat cooked in milk, and one verse serves to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from meat cooked in milk, and one verse serves to teach the prohibition against cooking meat in milk.

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says: It is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk but one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as it is stated: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and it states there with regard to the prohibition of an unslaughtered animal carcass: “And you shall be holy men to Me” (Exodus 22:30). Since both verses employ the term “holy” he derives: Just as there, in the case of an animal carcass, it is prohibited to eat it but one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as the Torah explicitly states that it may be sold to a gentile, so too here, with regard to meat cooked in milk, it is prohibited to eat it but one is permitted to derive benefit from it.

§ The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with the items it enumerated, or with non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, i.e., that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: The Torah said: Slaughter for Me, i.e., for offerings to God, in My place, inside the Temple courtyard, and your non-sacred animals that are intended for eating should be slaughtered in your place, outside the Temple courtyard. Just as one is prohibited from deriving benefit from My consecrated animals if they were slaughtered in your place, as one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a consecrated animal slaughtered outside the Temple, so too, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from your non-sacred animals if they were slaughtered in My place.

The Gemara asks: If so, just as the act of slaughtering My consecrated animals in your place is punishable by karet, so too, to the act of slaughtering your non-sacred animals in My place should be punishable by karet. To counter this logic, the verse states: “If a man from the house of Israel slaughters an ox or lamb…and has not brought it to the door of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord…and that man shall be cut off” (Leviticus 17:3–4). This teaches that it is only for an offering that one slaughtered outside the Tent of Meeting of the Tabernacle, or the Temple courtyard, that he is punishable with karet, but for non-sacred animals that one slaughtered in the Temple courtyard he is not punishable with karet.

The Gemara asks: In light of the above difference in halakha between these two cases, the entire comparison can be refuted in the following manner: What is an aspect unique to slaughtering My consecrated animals in your place? It is that it is punishable by karet, and is therefore a severe prohibition, which could explain the halakha that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from them. The prohibition against slaughtering a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard, which is not punishable by karet, could be regarded as a less severe prohibition, and perhaps in this case it is permitted to derive benefit from the slaughtered animal. Therefore, the halakha that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard still does not have a source.

Abaye quotes a lengthy baraita that serves as a source for the halakha that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Rather, Abaye said it is derived from here: The Torah states three verses that have a superfluous element with regard to the various species from which one may bring a peace-offering: The verse “and he slaughters it” (Leviticus 3:2), the verse “and he shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 3:8), and the verse “and he shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 3:13). The Torah could simply have stated: “And he shall slaughter,” without adding: “It.” Why must the verse state the term “it” these three times?

The baraita continues: The source for the halakha is because it is stated with regard to the ritual slaughter of animals for meat consumption: “If the place which the Lord your God shall choose to put His name there be too far from you, then you shall slaughter of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:21), from which it is derived: When you are far from the place, i.e., the Temple, you may slaughter non-sacred animals for meat consumption, but you may not slaughter non-sacred animals in a near place, i.e., in the Temple. The verse serves to exclude non-sacred animals, thereby teaching that they may not be slaughtered in the Temple courtyard.

The baraita continues: And I have derived the prohibition against slaughtering a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard only with regard to unblemished animals, which are fit to be sacrificed. From where do I know to include even blemished animals, which are not fit to be sacrificed, in this prohibition? I include blemished animals since they are at least of the type that is fit to be sacrificed. From where do I know to include the undomesticated animal, which is never sacrificed as an offering, in this prohibition? I include the undomesticated animal since it is rendered fit for consumption by means of slaughtering, like a domesticated animal. From where do I know to include fowl, as the Torah does not mention slaughter with regard to fowl, in this prohibition? The verse states: “And he slaughters it,” “and he shall slaughter it,” as well as “and he shall slaughter it,” employing the additional term “it” each time. These three verses teach that one may not slaughter any non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that one may not slaughter ab initio but if he did slaughter it would be permitted for him to eat it. Therefore, the verse states: “If the place which the Lord your God shall choose to put His name there be too far from you, then you shall slaughter of your herd and of your flock, which the Lord has given you, as I have commanded you, and you shall eat within your gates, after all the desire of your soul” (Deuteronomy 12:21), which is expounded as follows: That which you slaughter in a far place, outside the Temple, you may eat, but you may not eat that which you slaughter in a near place, which excludes non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is prohibited to eat a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard even after the fact.

The baraita continues: And I have derived only that the prohibition against eating the meat after the fact applies to unblemished animals,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 57b explores which animals remain permanently forbidden despite being alive, and derives from Leviticus the proper way to release the purification bird.