Talmud - Ketubot 61b כתובות ס״א ב׳

face blanch because he craved the food, so he took some of the food with his finger and put it in Mar Zutra’s mouth. The chief butler said to him: You have spoiled the king’s meal, as now he will not eat from it. The king’s soldiers who were there said to him: Why did you do this? He said to them: The one who makes such awful dishes is the one who actually spoiled the king’s food. They said to him: Why do you say this? He said to them: I saw something else, i.e., a leprous infection, in this meat. They checked and didn’t find anything. He took his finger and placed it on the food and said to them: Did you check here? They then checked that spot and found the infection. The Sages said to Rav Ashi: What is the reason that you relied on a miracle and assumed that leprosy would in fact be found there? He said to them: I saw a leprous spirit hovering over the food and realized that it had this defect.

The Gemara relates another incident with regard to a similar subject: A certain Roman said to a certain woman: Will you marry me? She said to him: No. In order to convince her, he went and brought pomegranates and peeled them and ate them in front of her and did not give her any of them. The aroma of the pomegranates caused her mouth to water, so she swallowed all of the saliva that caused her anguish, but he did not give her any until she became ill and bloated. Ultimately, he said to her: If I cure you, will you marry me? She said to him: Yes. He went and brought pomegranates, peeled them and ate them in front of her. He said to her: All of the saliva that causes you anguish, spit it out, spit it out. She did this until something like a green leaf came out of her, and then she was cured.

§ The mishna says that a wife must make thread from wool. The Gemara infers: She must make thread from wool, but she is not obligated to do so from flax. The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: A husband may not compel his wife to stand before his father and serve him, or to stand before his son and serve him, or to place straw before his animals, i.e., horses and donkeys, but he can compel her to place straw before his cattle, i.e., cows and bulls. Rabbi Yehuda said: He also cannot compel her to make thread from flax, because flax, while it is being spun, causes the mouth to smell foul and the lips to stiffen. The Gemara comments: This applies only to Roman flax, which causes the most damage.

§ The mishna continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he may compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Rav Malkiyyu said that Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika, said: The halakha discussed in tractate Beitza (28b) that a skewer that had been used for roasting meat but no longer has an olive-bulk of meat on it may be moved to a corner on a Festival; the halakha with regard to maidservants in the mishna here; and the halakha discussed in tractate Nidda (52a) that if a girl has two hair follicles in her pubic region, even if there are no hairs growing from them, she is considered to have reached majority and may perform ḥalitza; these three halakhot were all stated by Rav Malkiyyu.

However, the halakha discussed in tractate Avoda Zara (29a) that a Jew who cuts the hair of a pagan must stop at a distance of three fingerbreadths on every side before he reaches his forelock, as the pagans would grow their forelocks for idolatry and the Jew must not appear as if he were dressing the forelock for idolatrous purposes; and the halakha discussed in tractate Makkot (21a) that one may not place burnt ashes on a wound, as it looks like a tattoo; and the halakha discussed in tractate Avoda Zara (35b) that cheese made by a gentile is forbidden, because gentiles smooth the surface of their cheese with lard; these three halakhot were all stated by a different Sage named Rav Malkiya.

Rav Pappa said: The halakhot mentioned above that relate to a mishna or a baraita were stated by Rav Malkiya, whereas amoraic statements of halakhot that are not related to a mishna or baraita were taught by Rav Malkiyyu. And your mnemonic to remember this is: The mishna is a queen [malketa], indicating that the comments that are referring to a mishna were made by Rav Malkiya, whose name is similar to the Aramaic term for queen. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika, and Rav Pappa? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the halakha concerning maidservants. According to Rabbi Ḥanina, this halakha was stated by Rav Malkiyyu, whereas Rav Pappa holds that it was taught by Rav Malkiya, since it is referring to a dispute in a mishna.

§ The mishna says: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy. The Gemara asks: This is essentially the same as the opinion of the first tanna, Rabbi Eliezer, who said that idleness leads to licentiousness. The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case when she plays with small dogs [guriyyata kitanyata] or with games [nadrashir] like chess. Since there is something occupying her she is not in danger of idiocy, but occupying oneself with diversions of this type may still lead to licentiousness.

MISHNA: With regard to one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from marital relations with him, Beit Shammai say: He may maintain this situation for up to two weeks, but beyond that he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: He must divorce her if it continues beyond one week.

Apropos the husband’s obligation to his wife regarding marital relations, the Gemara mentions other aspects of this issue: Students may leave their homes and travel in order to learn Torah without their wives’ permission for up to thirty days, and laborers may leave their homes without their wives’ permission for up to one week. The set interval defining the frequency of a husband’s conjugal obligation to his wife stated in the Torah (see Exodus 21:10), unless the couple stipulated otherwise, varies according to the man’s occupation and proximity to his home: Men of leisure, who do not work, must engage in marital relations every day, laborers must do so twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once every thirty days, and sailors once every six months. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Beit Shammai say a husband may force abstinence on his wife by a vow for a period of up to two weeks without being compelled to divorce her? They derive this from the halakha that a woman who gave birth to a female is ritually impure and prohibited from engaging in conjugal relations with her husband for two weeks after childbirth (see Leviticus 12:5). From this they derive that a period of up to two weeks of abstinence is not deemed undue suffering. And from where do Beit Hillel derive their opinion? They derive it from a woman who gave birth to a male, as she is ritually impure for one week (see Leviticus 12:1–4).

The Gemara asks: And if this is so, Beit Hillel should also derive the halakha from a woman who gave birth to a female, since it is clear that the Torah does at times mandate a period of abstinence longer than one week. The Gemara answers: If they derived it from a woman who gave birth, this is indeed how they would have derived it. Rather, Beit Hillel derived it from the halakha with regard to a menstruating woman, who is prohibited from marital relations for seven days according to Torah law.

The Gemara explains: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that one should derive a common matter from a common matter. Consequently, they derive the halakha of a permitted abstinence by a husband who vowed not to engage in marital relations with his wife from the halakha of a menstruating woman, since both are common cases. And one Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that one should derive a matter that one caused, such as a vow, from a different matter that he caused, i.e., childbirth, and not from menstruation, which was not caused by him at all.

Rav said: The dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai concerns one who specifies the given period of time in his vow, but if he vowed not to engage in marital relations with her for an unspecified period of time, all agree that he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment for her marriage contract. The reason is that since he did not indicate how long he intended to keep the vow, her suffering begins immediately. And Shmuel said: Even with regard to an unspecified vow he should also wait for the same period of time, as perhaps he will find an extenuation enabling the dissolution of his vow and then he will not need to divorce her.

The Gemara asks: Didn’t they disagree about this issue once already? As we learned in a mishna (70a): In the case of one who vows that his wife is prohibited from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than that amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. And Rav said there: They taught this only with regard to a case where he specifies a limited time during which the vow would be in effect, but if he vows without specification, he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment for her marriage contract. And Shmuel said: Even when he vowed without specification, he should also wait, as perhaps he will discover an extenuation enabling the dissolution of his vow.

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to cite the dispute in both cases, as if it were stated only with regard to this case, of one who vows not to engage in marital relations, one might think that in this case Rav says he must divorce her because there is no possibility of appointing a trustee, but that with regard to that halakha, in the case when he vows not to provide sustenance, which can be provided by a trustee, one would say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that he should wait. Conversely, if the dispute was stated with regard to that case, where a trustee can be appointed, one might think that in that case Shmuel said to wait, but in this case of one who vows not to engage in marital relations, one might say that Shmuel concedes to Rav. Therefore, it is necessary to cite the dispute in both cases.

§ The mishna said that students may leave their homes and travel for up to thirty days in order to learn Torah, without their wives’ permission. The Gemara asks: If they went with permission, for how long can they go? The Gemara expresses wonderment at this question: If they went with the permission of their wives, they can go for as long as they want. If the husband and wife agree on this, why is there any reason for the court to intervene?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 61b explores miraculous discernment in detecting hidden illness, a healing folk tale involving cravings, and a wife's obligation to spin wool.