Talmud - Mo'ed Katan 18b מועד קטן י״ח ב׳

of barbers that are used to cover a person having a haircut, and body-drying towels may all be laundered on the intermediate days of a Festival. This statement implies that these garments, yes, they may be laundered, but other types of linen garments, no, they may not be laundered.

Abaye said to him: This is not a contradiction: The mishna is referring to garments made even of other types of materials; linen garments, however, may be laundered even when they serve other purposes. Bar Hedya said: I myself saw the Sea of Tiberias, the Sea of Galilee, to which basins full of linen garments were brought out to be laundered during the intermediate days of a Festival.

Abaye strongly objects to this: This report cannot be adduced as proof for the halakha, for who says to us that they did this in accordance with the will of the Sages? Perhaps they did it without the will of the Sages.

MISHNA: And these are the documents that may be written on the intermediate days of a Festival: Documents of betrothal of wives, through which bridegrooms betroth their brides; bills of divorce; receipts for the repayment of debts; wills [deyateiki]; deeds of gift; perozbolin, documents through which lenders authorize the courts to collect their loans on their behalf, thereby preventing the Sabbatical year from canceling their debts; letters of valuation, which were drawn up by the court when they valuated property and transferred it to the lender; and letters of sustenance, which were drawn up when one accepted upon himself to maintain another, e.g., his step-daughter.

The list continues: Documents of the ritual through which the brother-in-law frees the yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], thereby freeing her from the obligation to marry one of her deceased husband’s brothers; documents in which the court records the refusal of a girl upon reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father; documents of arbitration, in which the court summarizes a conflict that had been resolved through arbitration; court rulings; and the official correspondence of the ruling authorities.

GEMARA: Shmuel said: It is permitted to betroth a woman on the intermediate days of a Festival, lest another come and betroth her first. The Gemara asks: Let us say that the mishna supports Shmuel, who said: And these are the documents that may be drawn up on the intermediate days of a Festival: Documents of betrothal.

What, is the mishna not referring to actual documents of betrothal, through which one would actually betroth a woman? The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to documents of stipulation recording the amounts that the parents agree to pay as the dowry of their respective son or daughter, in accordance with what Rav Giddel said that Rav said.

For Rav Giddel said that Rav said: When two families negotiate the terms of marriage for their respective children, and one side says to the other: How much do you give to your son as a dowry? And the second side says: I give such and such amount; how much do you give to your daughter? And the first side responds: Such and such amount, then, once the bride and groom arose and pronounced the betrothal formula, then all of these obligations are acquired and therefore binding. These are among the things that are acquired through words alone. In other words, there is no need to perform an additional act of acquisition in order to confirm the agreement, and the mishna is referring to a document recording such an agreement. Although such a document may be drawn up even on the intermediate days of a Festival, this does not mean that one may actually betroth a woman during this period.

The Gemara asks: Let us say that the following mishna supports Shmuel: One may not marry a woman on the intermediate days of a Festival, neither a virgin nor a widow; nor may one then perform levirate marriage with his sister-in-law, if his brother died childless, because that would be a joyous occasion for him. This statement implies that it is only marrying that is prohibited, but betrothing is permitted.

The Gemara rejects this argument: This is not the correct way to understand the mishna, as it is speaking in the style of: Needless to say. It is needless to say that betrothal is not permitted, because the groom does not perform a mitzva through betrothal. Rather, the same is true even of marriage, through which one performs a mitzva, as marriage is preparation for fulfilling the mitzva of procreation. It is still not permitted.

The Gemara offers another support for Shmuel: Come and hear that which a Sage of the school of Shmuel taught in the following baraita: One may betroth a woman on the intermediate days of a Festival, but he may not marry her, nor may he make a betrothal feast, nor may he perform levirate marriage, because that would be a joyous occasion for him, and one may not mix the joy of a wedding with the joy of the Festival. The Gemara concludes: Learn from this a support for Shmuel’s opinion.

The Gemara raises a question about the ruling itself: And did Shmuel actually say that we are concerned that perhaps another man will come and betroth the woman first? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said: Every day a Divine Voice issues forth and says: The daughter of so-and-so is destined to be the wife of so-and-so; the field of so-and-so will belong to so-and-so? If this is the case, why should one be concerned lest another betroth her first? It is predestined that he will marry his designated mate.

Rather, Shmuel’s statement should be understood as follows: Perhaps another man will come and betroth her first by means of praying for divine mercy. In other words, Shmuel is concerned that the rival may beseech God to cancel the decree of the Divine Voice, and therefore the first man needs to hurry and betroth the woman before the other one has a chance to pray that he should take her from him.

This is like this incident, in which Rava heard a certain man asking for mercy, i.e., praying, who said: Grant me so-and-so as a wife. Rava said to him: Do not pray and ask for mercy in this way. If she is fit for you, and it has been decreed that she will be your wife, she will not go away from you. And if she is not destined to be your wife, you will come to deny the Lord when you see that your prayer is not answered. After the man married this woman, Rava heard him say in prayer: Please either let him die before her or let her die before him. He was speaking about himself and his wife because he had grown to hate her so much. Rava said to him: Did I not say to you not to pray for this matter?

Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili as follows: From the Torah, and from the Prophets, and from the Writings; it implies that the decree that a specific woman is destined to be married to a specific man is from God. From where is this derived? It is from the Torah, as it is written: “Then Laban and Bethuel answered and said: The thing comes from the Lord, we cannot speak to you either bad or good” (Genesis 24:50). From the Prophets, as it is written: “But his father and his mother knew not that it was of the Lord” (Judges 14:4). From the Writings, as it is written: “House and riches are the inheritance of fathers; but a prudent woman is from the Lord” (Proverbs 19:14).

§ Apropos a teaching of Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili, the Gemara states that Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili, and some say that it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili said: A man is suspected of having done something wrong only if he has indeed done so. And if he did not do it wholly, then probably he did it partly. And if he did not do it even partly, then probably he thought in his heart to do it. And if he did not even think to himself to do it, then certainly he saw others doing it and was happy. Suspicions do not arbitrarily arise about a person; therefore there is certainly some basis for them.

Rabbi Ya’akov raised an objection: Does the verse not say: “And the children of Israel fabricated matters that were not right against the Lord their God” (II Kings 17:9), which indicates that it is possible to make up stories about someone else even though they are entirely baseless. The Gemara answers: There they did it in order to anger God, but they did not actually think that what they were saying was true.

Come and hear a challenge from a different source: The verse states: “And they were jealous of Moses in the camp, of Aaron the Lord’s holy one” (Psalms 106:16). Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: This verse teaches that every man warned his wife against seclusion with Moses because he was jealous. This implies that every man thought that his wife had secluded herself with Moses and sinned, although this was certainly not the case. This demonstrates that it is possible to suspect an absolutely innocent person. The Gemara answers: There they did it out of hatred for Moses. They did not actually suspect him of wrongdoing. Instead, their goal was to degrade him by leveling these false accusations against him.

The Gemara raises another challenge, based on yet another source: Come and hear that which Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion in the future world be with one who is suspected of a certain wrongdoing but is innocent, as the pain that such a person experiences atones for his sins. This statement also appears to imply that it is possible to suspect an absolutely innocent person. And Rav Pappa said: They suspected me of a certain wrongdoing but I was not guilty.

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This is referring to a rumor that stops, and therefore it is possible that it is groundless, whereas that is referring to a rumor that does not stop, and in that case there must be a factual basis for the suspicion. The Gemara asks: To be considered a rumor that does not stop, for how long must it persist? Abaye said: My nurse told me: Local gossip lasts for a day and a half, and then it is deemed to be a rumor that does not stop.

The Gemara comments: This applies only if the rumor did not stop in between, during the day and a half, but if it stopped in between then we have no problem with it, and it is not a persistent rumor. And if the rumor stopped in between, we said that it is considered baseless only if it stopped of its own accord and not out of fear, i.e., because the suspect is violent and therefore people are afraid to speak badly about him. But if the rumor stopped out of fear, then this dispensation does not apply, and it is still assumed that there must be some basis to the rumor.

And we said that a rumor that stopped is assumed to be baseless only if it did not arise again. But if it arose again, then this does not apply. And we said that a rumor that does not stop must be taken seriously only if the slandered person has no enemies. But if he has known enemies, then it can be assumed that it was the enemies who disseminated the rumor.

MISHNA: One may not write bills of debt on the intermediate days of a Festival. But if the lender does not trust the borrower, and he is concerned that the borrower will later deny the loan, or if the scribe has nothing to eat, then he may write a bill of debt during the Festival week.

One may not write Torah scrolls, phylacteries, or mezuzot on the intermediate days of a Festival, nor may one correct a single letter, even in the Torah scroll of Ezra, which was kept in the Temple and upon which all the Jewish communities relied. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may write phylacteries and mezuzot for himself on the intermediate days of a Festival if he needs them.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

MoedKatan 18b discusses laundering linen garments during a festival's intermediate days, then lists legal documents permitted to be written then, like divorce and betrothal deeds.