Talmud - Ketubot 86b כתובות פ״ו ב׳

the court strikes him an unlimited number of times, even until his soul departs, in order to force him to perform the mitzva. The payment of a debt is a positive mitzva, and one who refuses to pay a debt can be compelled to do so in this manner.

§ Rami bar Ḥama inquired of Rav Ḥisda: If a man said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce but you are divorced with it only after thirty days, and she took the bill of divorce and went and placed it in the sides of the public domain, i.e., in a place that was open to the public domain but not an actual part of it, and the bill of divorce was still there after thirty days, what is the halakha? Is she divorced?

Rav Ḥisda said to him: She is not divorced. This halakha is learned from the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, as it is Rav and Shmuel who both say with regard to the mishna: Any of the creditors of a deceased person can seize items of his movable property provided that they are arranged in piles and placed in the public domain, as in that case the heirs of the deceased do not receive it as part of their inheritance. Similarly, the woman will not acquire the bill of divorce after thirty days if it is in that location. Rav Ḥisda adds: And the sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain.

Rami bar Ḥama responded: On the contrary, she is divorced, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: With regard to one who says to his friend: Go and pull this cow now and it will be acquired by you only after thirty days, he has acquired the cow. And this is true even if the cow was standing after those thirty days in an ownerless meadow [agam]. Since the acquisition began properly at the start of the thirty-day period, it applies even after the thirty-day period. What, is it not the case that this is the halakha of a meadow and this is also the halakha of the sides of the public domain, as the two places have a similar status? Rav Ḥisda rejects this argument: No, the case of a meadow is discrete, and the case of the sides of the public domain is discrete, as the latter is considered an actual part of the public domain, and an ownerless meadow is not.

Some say a different version of the dispute between Rami bar Ḥama and Rav Ḥisda, in which Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: She is divorced, based on the ruling of Rav Naḥman pertaining to acquiring a cow, and the sides of the public domain are considered like a meadow. In this version, it was Rami bar Ḥama who replied: On the contrary, she is not divorced, as can be learned from the opinion of Rav and Shmuel pertaining to seizing objects in the public domain. What, is it not the case that this is the halakha of the public domain and this is similarly the halakha of the sides of the public domain? Rav Ḥisda responded: No, the public domain is discrete and the sides of the public domain are discrete.

MISHNA: If there is one who establishes his wife as a storekeeper in his store, or if he appointed her as a steward to handle his property and workers, this one, i.e., the husband, can administer an oath to her, having her state that she did not appropriate any of his possessions, whenever he wants. Rabbi Eliezer says: He can administer an oath even with regard to the products of her spindle and for her dough, which are matters related to the household, and not her function as a storekeeper.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rabbi Eliezer says that a husband can administer an oath to her with regard to any item, is he saying that this is by means of extension of an oath, i.e., once he administers an oath to her in her capacity as his storekeeper he can extend the oath to cover other matters, or, is he saying that he can administer an oath to her ab initio?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution from a baraita: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: A person does not reside in a basket with a snake. A woman is not expected to live with a husband who constantly suspects her of stealing. The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to an oath administered ab initio, the Rabbis spoke well. However, if you say that the husband can administer an oath only by means of an extension of an oath, what difference does it make to her? As she must take an oath with regard to matters that concern the store, it does not cause any greater difficulty for her to take an oath with regard to the household matters.

The Gemara refutes this argument, as it is possible that she says to him: Since you are so exacting with me, I cannot live with you. Even if there is no additional oath, the sentiment engendered by his demand is grounds for dissatisfaction, and there is no proof that Rabbi Eliezer holds that he can administer an oath to her ab initio.

The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who did not exempt his wife in the marriage contract from a vow and from an oath, and he established her as his storekeeper or appointed her as his steward, he can administer an oath to her whenever he wants. If he did not establish her as his storekeeper or appoint her as his steward, he cannot administer an oath to her.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: Although he did not establish her as his storekeeper or appoint her as his steward, he can administer an oath to her whenever he wants, as you have no wife who did not become a steward for one hour in her husband’s lifetime at least for her spindle and for her dough. The Rabbis said to him: A person does not reside in a basket with a snake. One can conclude from this that according to Rabbi Eliezer a husband can administer an oath to his wife with regard to her conduct, even ab initio. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that it is so.

MISHNA: If one wrote to his wife in the marriage contract: I do not have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, he cannot administer an oath to her. However, he can administer an oath to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority, either as her representatives or because they purchased her marriage contract.

If the husband wrote: I do not have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority, he cannot administer an oath to her; not to her, nor her heirs, nor those who come on her authority. But the husband’s heirs can administer an oath to her, and to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority.

If he wrote: Neither I, nor my heirs, nor those who come on my authority have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority, he cannot administer an oath to her or to them; not he, nor his heirs, nor those who come on his authority may administer an oath, not to her, nor to her heirs, nor to those who come on her authority.

If a woman who was exempted from an oath by her husband went from her husband’s grave, immediately after her husband’s death, to her father’s house, without handling her late husband’s property, or in a case where she returned to her father-in-law’s house and did not become a steward over the property at all throughout this period, then the heirs cannot administer an oath to her with regard to her actions in their father’s lifetime, as the husband exempted her from an oath to the heirs. And if she became a steward, the heirs may administer an oath to her about the future, i.e., anything she did with the property after the death of her husband, but they cannot administer an oath to her with regard to what took place in the past, during her husband’s lifetime.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the purpose of an oath? What oath can he administer to her that caused him to add this condition to her marriage contract? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 86b explores court-enforced debt collection and a delayed divorce document left in a public-adjacent space, questioning its legal validity.