Talmud - Ketubot 79b כתובות ע״ט ב׳

the offspring of an animal of a woman’s usufruct property must pay payment of double the principal to the woman. Apparently this ruling is based on the assumption that the offspring is not treated as the produce of her property but as the principal, which belongs to the woman.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion was this halakha stated? It is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and not in accordance with that of Ḥananya. The Gemara explains the dispute alluded to here: As it is taught in a baraita: The offspring of a usufruct animal belongs to the husband, whereas the child of a usufruct maidservant belongs to the wife. And Ḥananya, son of Yoshiya’s brother, said: They made the status of the child of a usufruct maidservant like that of the offspring of a usufruct animal, which belongs to the husband. Both opinions in the baraita agree that the offspring of a usufruct animal belongs to the husband. Why, then, must the thief pay the double payment to the woman?

The Gemara answers: You can even say that all agree with Rabbi Yannai’s ruling, as there is a difference between the general use of property and the double payment. This is because the Sages instituted for the husband to consume the produce, but the Sages did not institute for him to consume the produce of the produce. The double payment does not have the status of the offspring itself but of produce resulting from its theft, which is considered the produce of the produce and therefore is given to the woman.

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Ḥananya, who equates the halakha of a maidservant’s child to that of an animal’s offspring, this is because we are not concerned about the death of the mother. Therefore, the mother is the principal while its offspring is considered the produce.

But according to the Rabbis, if they are concerned about the death of the mother, and this is why a maidservant’s child belongs to the wife, even the offspring of a usufruct animal should not have the status of produce either. Rather, it should have the status of principal, because if the usufruct animal dies the woman will be left with nothing. Therefore, the offspring should be viewed as a replacement for its mother. And if they are not concerned about the death of the mother, even the child of a usufruct maidservant should also belong to the husband as the produce of her property. Why, then, do they distinguish between these two cases?

The Gemara answers: Actually, the Rabbis are concerned about death, but the halakha of an animal is different, as there is still its hide, which remains after death. Therefore, the principal is not entirely lost even if the animal dies.

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya that the child of a maidservant belongs to the husband. Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: Although Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya, Ḥananya concedes that if the woman was divorced, she pays money and takes the children of her maidservants, because they are assets of her paternal family, and it is unfitting for the children of her family’s slaves to belong to someone else.

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If she brought in to the marriage for him a goat for its milk, or a sheep for its shearings, or a hen for its eggs, or a palm tree for its produce, the husband continues to consume the produce until the principal is consumed, and there is no concern that the woman will remain with nothing of value. Similarly, Rav Naḥman said: If she brought in for him a cloak as her usufruct property, it is produce, and he may cover himself with it until it is consumed.

The Gemara comments: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: If a wife’s usufruct property includes a location on the shore from which salt and sand are extracted, this extract is deemed produce. As for a quarry of sulfur or a mine of alum, Rabbi Meir says: These are deemed principal, as the mine contains a finite amount of substance, and the Rabbis say: Extractions from such locations are produce, while the location of the mine is the principal. Rav Naḥman’s ruling that the cloak is deemed produce is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that the extractions are deemed produce.

§ The mishna stated that Rabbi Shimon says: In a case where his right is superior upon her entrance, his right is inferior upon her exit if he divorces her. Conversely, in the case where his right is inferior upon her entrance, his right is superior upon her exit. The Gemara asks: The statement of Rabbi Shimon is identical to that of the first tanna, i.e., the Rabbis. Why, then, are both necessary? Rava said: The practical difference between them is the status of produce that was attached at the time of her departure from the marriage. The Rabbis, who did not directly address this issue, maintain that it belongs to him, whereas Rabbi Shimon says it belongs to her.

MISHNA: If elderly slaves or maidservants were bequeathed to her, they are sold and land is acquired with them, and the husband consumes the produce of the land. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She need not sell these slaves and maidservants, because they are assets of her paternal family, and it would be shameful to the family if they were sold to others. Likewise, if old olive trees or grapevines were bequeathed to her, they are sold and land is acquired with them, and he consumes the produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: She need not sell them, because they are assets of her paternal family.

GEMARA: Rav Kahana said that Rav said: This dispute concerning olive trees and grapevines is referring to a case when they were bequeathed to her in her field, as they are assets of her paternal family, and therefore Rabbi Yehuda rules that she need not sell them. But if she received them in a field that is not hers, everyone agrees that she must sell them because the principal will be consumed. Since these trees will not yield much produce, they will eventually be uprooted, and transitory property is not included in the category of assets of her paternal family.

Rav Yosef objects to this: But elderly slaves and maidservants are considered like a field that is not hers, as nothing will remain of the principal, and yet Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the first tanna disagree over this case. The Gemara retracts: Rather, if the above statement of Rav Kahana was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav Kahana said that Rav said: This dispute with regard to olive trees and vines is referring to when they are located in a field that is not hers, but if they are located in her field, everyone agrees that she need not sell them, because they are assets of her paternal family.

MISHNA: With regard to one who pays expenditures for his wife’s property in an effort to improve it, if he paid a large amount in expenditures and ate only a small amount of produce before he divorced her, or if he paid a small amount in expenditures and ate a large quantity of produce, that which he spent he has spent, and that which he ate he has eaten. Therefore, none of it need be returned. However, if he paid expenditures for the property and did not eat any part of it, he takes an oath with regard to how much he paid and then takes his expenditures.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And how much is a small amount? Rabbi Asi said: It is even one dried fig, provided he ate it in a dignified manner befitting the owner of the produce and did not eat it by snatching the produce. It was said

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 79b examines whether offspring or double-theft payments from a wife's usufruct property belong to husband or wife, citing disputes with Chananya.