Talmud - Menachot 4a מנחות ד׳ א׳

what should I understand that Rabbi Shimon says with regard to such a case? Is the reason of Rabbi Shimon, who says that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering is valid and effects acceptance, that intent that is recognizably false does not disqualify an offering? And if so, this meal offering from which a handful is removed for the sake of an animal offering is also a case of intent that is recognizably false, and therefore the meal offering should not be disqualified.

Or perhaps the reason of Rabbi Shimon is that it is written: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), which indicates that there is one law for all meal offerings. If so, then a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering should be disqualified, since it is not written: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering. Rav Asi said to Rav Hoshaya: Have we ascertained the depth of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in this matter? In other words, Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning is not known.

The Gemara explains why Rav Asi did not resolve this dilemma. Rav Asi did not resolve the dilemma of Rav Hoshaya in accordance with the resolution stated by Rabba, that there is a distinction between one who removes the handful of a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering and one who removes it for the sake of another owner, because of the difficulty posed by Abaye (2b), that the halakha of both these cases is derived from the same comparison in the Torah between meal offerings and animal offerings.

Likewise, Rav Asi did not resolve the dilemma in accordance with the resolution stated by Rava, that the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering” teaches that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering is valid, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering is disqualified. This is because of the difficulty arising from the verse: “And this is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), i.e., despite this verse, the halakha is that a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering is not valid.

Finally, Rav Asi did not resolve the dilemma in accordance with the resolution stated by Rav Ashi, that there is a distinction between one who removes the handful of a meal offering prepared in one vessel for the sake of a different vessel, and one who removes it for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a different vessel, because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava. This difficulty concerns a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of one mixed with oil; Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering is valid despite the fact that the person’s intent referred to the meal offering itself, not the vessel.

§ The mishna teaches that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice, except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy. The Gemara asks: Granted, the meal offering of a sinner is disqualified when a handful is removed from it not for its own sake, as the Merciful One calls it a sin offering, in the verse: “He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense upon it, for it is a sin offering. And he shall bring it to the priest, and the priest shall take his handful” (Leviticus 5:11–12). This verse indicates that just as a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its own sake, so too, the meal offering of a sinner is disqualified when a handful is removed from it not for its own sake. But with regard to the meal offering of jealousy, from where do we derive that this is the halakha?

The Gemara answers that this halakha may be derived from a baraita, as a tanna taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: With regard to money that was designated for a meal offering of jealousy, its surplus, i.e., the money remaining after the purchase of the meal offering, is used to purchase communal gift offerings.

Rav Naḥman said to him: You are saying well, as it is written with regard to a meal offering of jealousy: “Bringing iniquity to remembrance” (Numbers 5:15), and it is written with regard to a sin offering: “And He has given it you to bear the iniquity of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17). A verbal analogy is drawn between the two uses of the term “iniquity” in these verses. This teaches that just as in the case of a sin offering, its surplus is used to purchase communal gift offerings, so too, with regard to a meal offering of jealousy, its surplus is used to purchase communal gift offerings. And a meal offering of jealousy is also like a sin offering in another aspect: Just as a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its own sake, so too, a meal offering of jealousy is disqualified when a handful is removed from it not for its own sake.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the halakha of a meal offering of jealousy is derived from a verbal analogy to a sin offering based on the word “iniquity,” then a guilt offering should also be disqualified if it was sacrificed not for its own sake, as a similar verbal analogy may be derived from the verse that states: “The iniquity [avon] of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17), with regard to a sin offering, and the verse that states: “And shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17), in connection with a guilt offering.

The Gemara responds: One derives a verbal analogy based on the word “iniquity” from a verse that likewise uses the term “iniquity,” but one does not derive a verbal analogy based on the term “his iniquity [avono]” from a verse that uses the term “iniquity.”

The Gemara asks: What difference is there? Didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach the following verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses? The verse states: “And the priest shall return [veshav] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse concerning the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [uva] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning, and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week. All the more so should a less pronounced difference of one letter between avon and avono not prevent the teaching of a verbal analogy.

And furthermore, let one derive a verbal analogy through the term “his iniquity” stated with regard to a guilt offering, and the term “his iniquity” from the verse concerning the sin offering brought for the iniquity for hearing the voice, i.e., the sin offering of one who takes a false oath that he does not have any information relevant to a matter when another requests that he testify about it, as it is written: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1).

Rather, it must be that when the verbal analogy was derived, it was derived only with regard to the halakha that the surplus from the money designated for a meal offering of jealousy is used to purchase communal gift offerings, and not with regard to the halakha that a meal offering of jealousy from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified.

And if you would say that there is a principle that there is no partial verbal analogy, that principle does not apply in this instance. As the Merciful One revealed with regard to a sin offering that the halakha of other offerings may not be derived from this case, as the verse states: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). This verse indicates that it, i.e., a sin offering, when slaughtered for its own sake is valid, and when slaughtered not for its own sake is disqualified. But all other sacrificial animals, whether sacrificed for their sake or not for their sake, are valid.

The Gemara asks: But if the Merciful One revealed that one cannot derive the halakha of other offerings that were sacrificed not for their sake from a sin offering, then from where do we derive the halakha that the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy are disqualified when a handful is removed from them not for their sake?

The Gemara explains: With regard to a sin offering, what is the reason that it is disqualified when sacrificed not for its own sake? It is because it is written with regard to this offering: “It,” in a verse discussing the sin offering of the Nasi: “It is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). This indicates that a sin offering is valid only when it is sacrificed for its own sake. So too, it is written with regard to them, i.e., the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy: “It.” In the case of the meal offering of a sinner the verse states: “It is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11), and with regard to the meal offering of jealousy it is written: “It is a meal offering of jealousy” (Numbers 5:15).

The Gemara challenges: But if so, concerning a guilt offering as well, it is written about this offering: “It,” as the verse states: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5). Accordingly, a guilt offering should likewise be disqualified if it is slaughtered not for its own sake. The Gemara responds: That term “it” is written with regard to the stage after the burning of the sacrificial portions [eimurin] of a guilt offering, which are intended for burning upon the altar.

As it is taught in a baraita: One derives from the word “it” that if the offering was slaughtered not for its own sake it is disqualified only in the case of a sin offering. But concerning a guilt offering, it is stated about this offering: “It is a guilt offering,” only with regard to the stage after the burning of the sacrificial portions. The baraita adds: One cannot derive that if these portions were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering then the offering is disqualified, since the guilt offering itself is valid if its sacrificial portions were not burned upon the altar at all.

The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the word “it” stated with regard to a guilt offering? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit if it was sacrificed as a burnt offering.

The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit if it was sacrificed as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to another purpose.

§ The mishna teaches that all the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice but they do not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Concerning this, Rav says: With regard to the omer meal offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:9–14), if the priest removed a handful from it not for its own sake it is disqualified. It is disqualified since an omer meal offering came for a specific purpose, namely, to permit the consumption of the new crop, and this meal offering did not permit the consumption of the new crop because its rites were performed not for its own sake. And so you say with regard to the guilt offering of a nazirite who became ritually impure, whose proper sacrifice enables the nazirite to restart his naziriteship afresh in purity,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Menachot 4a explores Rabbi Shimon's reasoning on invalid intent during meal offerings, debating whether mixing offering types disqualifies them.