Talmud - Menachot 103a מנחות ק״ג א׳

only when he assigned it at the time of the vow. But if at the time of the vow he simply said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, and at the time of the designation of the fine flour as a meal offering he specified a particular type of meal offering, he is not obligated to bring that type, and if he brought a different type, he has still fulfilled his obligation.

The reason for this is that the Torah states: “That which has emerged from your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). Since it states: “According to what you have vowed,” and not: According to what you have designated to fulfill your vow, only matters specified as part of the vow are essential to its content.

It was also stated that Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The tanna’im taught in the mishna that meal offerings are not valid only when he established their type at the time of the vow and subsequently brought a different type of meal offering. But if he mentioned one type of meal offering at the time of the designation of the flour, and then brought it differently, it is not invalid, as the Torah states: “According to what you have vowed,” and not: According to what you have designated for your vow.

MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from barley, should bring the meal offering from wheat, as voluntary meal offerings are brought exclusively from wheat. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from flour, should bring the meal offering from fine flour, as it is written: “His offering shall be of fine flour” (Leviticus 2:1). If one vows to bring a meal offering without oil and without frankincense, he should bring it with oil and frankincense, as voluntary meal offerings require oil and frankincense.

If one vows to bring as a meal offering half a tenth of an ephah, he should bring a complete tenth of an ephah, the minimum measure of a voluntary meal offering. If one vows to bring a meal offering of a tenth and a half an ephah, he should bring two tenths, as there are no partial tenths of an ephah brought in meal offerings. Rabbi Shimon deems one exempt from bringing a meal offering in all these cases. This is because the vow does not take effect, as he did not pledge in the manner of those who pledge.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why is the vow to bring a meal offering from barley valid? It is seemingly a case of a vow and its extenuation together. The statement: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, is a valid vow, while the next term: From barley, constitutes a retraction, as the speaker knows that a meal offering may not be brought from barley.

Ḥizkiyya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: In the case of one who stated a declaration comprising two contradictory statements, attend only to the first statement. As we learned in a mishna (Nazir 9a): If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs, which is a contradictory statement, as figs are not prohibited to a nazirite, Beit Shammai say: He is a full-fledged nazirite, as one attends only to the first statement, i.e., I am hereby a nazirite, and the second part is discounted. And Beit Hillel say: The second part of his statement is not discounted, and therefore he is not a nazirite, as he did not accept naziriteship upon himself.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. It is referring to one who, upon being informed that such a vow is not effective, says: Had I known that one cannot vow in this manner to bring barley for a meal offering, I would not have vowed in this manner but rather in that manner, by vowing to bring wheat instead.

§ The Gemara cites another disagreement between Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan about the mishna: Ḥizkiyya says that the Sages taught in the mishna only that where he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from barley, he can bring a meal offering from wheat instead, but if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from lentils, the vow is not valid.

The Gemara asks: Now, Ḥizkiyya said that his tradition of interpreting the mishna is that it is in accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with Beit Shammai’s opinion, and Beit Shammai’s ruling is due to the principle that one should attend only to the first statement. If so, what is the difference to me whether he vowed to bring a meal offering from barley or from lentils? In either case, that principle should require him to bring a meal offering from wheat. The Gemara answers: Ḥizkiyya retracted his initial explanation that the mishna is in accordance with Beit Shammai, and subscribes to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that he retracted his explanation? Rava said: The mishna posed a difficulty for him: Why does the tanna specifically teach this halakha using the example of a meal offering from barley? Let it teach the halakha using the example of a meal offering from lentils, which is a greater novelty.

Rather, learn from it that the reason the vow takes effect is because one may err. With regard to barley, it is reasonable that one may err, since one of the individual meal offerings, the meal offering of a sota, comes from barley. But with regard to lentils, one would not err in thinking that one may bring a meal offering from them. Therefore, one can presume that by saying: Lentils, he intended to negate his initial statement.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to the mishna, even if he vowed to bring a meal offering from lentils, the vow takes effect. The Gemara asks: Now, Rabbi Yoḥanan states that his tradition in interpreting the mishna is that it is in accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and Beit Hillel understand that the reason the meal offering takes effect is because one may reasonably err. One may err with regard to barley being fit for a meal offering, but with regard to lentils, he will not err that they are fit. Why then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan hold that the meal offering takes effect even if he said: Lentils?

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan does in fact hold that when he vows to bring a meal offering from lentils it is not valid. What he said was in response to the statement of Ḥizkiyya. Rabbi Yoḥanan is saying to him: What is the reason that you retracted your explanation of the mishna as being in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? It is because the mishna does not teach using the example of one who vowed to bring a meal offering from lentils, which would have been a greater novelty.

Rabbi Yoḥanan questions this reasoning: Perhaps the mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to say that when one vows to bring a meal offering from lentils, the vow takes effect and he brings a meal offering from wheat. He brings it because one has reason to say that he in fact intended to vow and then retracted his initial statement, and yet the vow takes effect in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that one should attend only to the initial statement and his retraction is disregarded. But even if he vowed to bring a meal offering from barley, where one has reason to say he made an error, and had he known that a meal offering is not brought from barley, he would not have vowed at all, nevertheless, the vow takes effect and he must bring a meal offering, due to the principle: Attend only to the first statement.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Menachot 103a examines how vow wording determines meal offering obligations, requiring wheat, fine flour, oil, and frankincense over barley or plain flour.