Talmud - Bava Kamma 99b בבא קמא צ״ט ב׳

Rava said another interpretation: Everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period a craftsman is hired to its end; and everyone agrees that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed; and everyone agrees that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel.

But with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he added a jewel [nofekh] of his own for her. Rabbi Meir holds that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta, her mind is focused on the peruta. Therefore, in this case the jewel serves as the betrothal money. And the Rabbis hold that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta her mind is focused on the loan, so the loan serves as the betrothal money, and if one betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed.

And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the dispute between these tanna’im. As it is taught in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:4): If one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I have worked for you, she is not betrothed, as the payment is a loan, since she already owes him this money. But if he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I will work for you, she is betrothed, as from the moment he is entitled to the money, he gives it to her for her betrothal. Rabbi Natan says: If he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I will work for you, she is not betrothed, as Rabbi Natan holds that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, which means that upon the completion of the labor it is a loan, and all the more so if he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I have worked for you.

The baraita cites a third opinion: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Actually they said that the halakha is that regardless of whether he said: With the payment for which I have worked for you, or whether he said: With the payment for which I will work for you, she is not betrothed. But if he added a jewel of his own for her, she is betrothed.

The Gemara clarifies the dispute: What difference is there between the first tanna and Rabbi Natan? The difference between them is with regard to a wage: Is the obligation incurred continuously or only upon the completion of the work? The difference between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the issue of a loan and one peruta. Rabbi Natan holds that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta her mind is focused on the loan, and in this case his jewel is disregarded; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that her mind is focused on the peruta, in this case the jewel, and she is betrothed with the jewel.

§ The Gemara now returns to the topic of a craftsman who damages the item with which he is working. Shmuel says: An expert butcher who damaged an animal by slaughtering it incorrectly, thereby rendering it non-kosher, is liable to pay the owner of the animal for the damage. Why? He is one who causes damage; he is negligent; he is like one who is told by the animal’s owner to slaughter it from here, i.e., the area of the throat where ritual slaughter is performed, and he slaughtered it from there, i.e., a different area of the throat, in violation of the owner’s wishes.

The Gemara asks: Why must he say both that the butcher is one who causes damage and that he is negligent? The Gemara explains: If Shmuel had said only that he is one who causes damage, I would say that this statement applies only in a case where the butcher slaughtered the animal for pay, in which case, due to the extra responsibility that he bears, he is considered to be one who caused damage and is liable to pay even in a case where the damage was unintentional; but in a case where he does the work for free, I would say no, he is exempt from liability in a case where the damage was unintentional. Shmuel therefore teaches us that the butcher is negligent, and one who works without pay is analogous to an unpaid bailee, who is liable to pay for damage caused by negligence.

Rav Ḥama bar Gurya raised an objection to Shmuel from the Tosefta (10:10): With regard to one who gives an animal to a butcher, and the butcher killed it in a way that rendered it an animal carcass, if the butcher is an expert, then he is exempt from liability; if he is an ordinary person, without particular expertise in the act of ritual slaughter, he is liable. And if the owner of the animal paid the butcher, then regardless of whether he is an ordinary person or whether he is an expert, the butcher is liable to pay for the damage. This indicates that an expert butcher who slaughtered the animal improperly is exempt if he slaughtered it without pay. Shmuel said to him: May your mind be muddled for raising a ridiculous objection.

One of the Sages came and raised the same objection to Shmuel. Shmuel said to him: Now you shall receive what your friend received from me, since I say to you my statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and you say to me, i.e., you raise an objection, based upon the opinion of the Rabbis. Why were you not precise in your consideration of my choice of words? As I say: He is one who causes damage; he is negligent; he is like one who is told by the animal’s owner to slaughter it from here, and he slaughtered it from there. Who accepts this reasoning? It is Rabbi Meir, who says: He should have taken upon himself the responsibility to perform his task properly, and if he did not, he is liable to pay for the damage that he caused. The other baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt him from liability.

The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabbi Meir is Shmuel referring to? If we say it is this statement of Rabbi Meir, that is difficult. Parenthetically, the Gemara states that the letters kuf, lamed, nun serve as a mnemonic device for the three statements of Rabbi Meir that will be cited. It stands for: He tied it [kesharo], to dye [litzboa], and broke [nishbera].

The Gemara returns to the matter at hand: As we learned in a mishna (45b): If the ox’s owner tied it with reins to a fence or locked the gate before it in an appropriate manner, but nevertheless the ox emerged and caused damage, whether the ox is innocuous or forewarned the owner is liable, since this is not considered sufficient precaution to prevent damage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. As the Gemara explains on 45b, Rabbi Meir holds that a forewarned ox requires a heightened level of safeguarding, and since the owner did not safeguard it, he is liable. The same would apply here, that one who agrees to perform a task must exercise care in executing it. Otherwise, he will be held liable to pay for damage.

The Gemara explains why this cannot be the statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel was referring to: There, in that mishna, the Sages disagree with regard to the interpretation of biblical verses, not logical reasoning, as the Gemara explains there, and conclusions cannot be drawn from that halakha to this one.

Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel is referring to, as we learned in a mishna (100b): If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him, and he dyed it black, or to dye it black, and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner the value of his wool, indicating that he is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara rejects this opinion: This statement also does not prove that according to Rabbi Meir a worker is liable to pay for a job performed improperly, since there, the dyer burned the wool, thereby removing it from the owner by direct action.

Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel is referring to, as we learned in a baraita: If one’s jug broke on the road and he did not remove it, or if his camel fell on the road and he did not stand it up, Rabbi Meir says: He is liable for the damage that they cause, and the Rabbis say: He is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara notes: And we maintain that they disagree with regard to the question of whether one who stumbles is considered negligent. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, one who stumbles is considered negligent, since he should have paid attention while walking. He is therefore liable for whatever damage he causes. In the case of an expert butcher as well, Rabbi Meir holds that he is considered negligent when damaging the animal he slaughtered, and the Rabbis hold that he is not negligent and therefore exempt from liability.

The Gemara discusses Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion concerning the case of an expert butcher. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An expert butcher who damaged an animal by slaughtering it incorrectly, thereby rendering it non-kosher, is liable to pay the owner of the animal, and even if he is as expert as the butchers of Tzippori, it is not considered an accident, and he is considered to be at fault. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that there was an incident in which a butcher who damaged an animal was brought to court before Rabbi Yoḥanan in the synagogue of the town Maon, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the butcher: Go bring proof that you are an expert at slaughtering chickens, and I will exempt you from payment.

The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Here, in the aforementioned incident, the butcher slaughtered the animal for free, and he is therefore exempt, while there, in Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s previous statement, he slaughtered the animal for pay, and is therefore liable to pay for the damage. This is in accordance with that which Rabbi Zeira says: One who wants a butcher to be liable to pay him in the event that he damages the animal during slaughter should advance him a dinar, so that he is paid for his services, and he is consequently liable to pay damages.

The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta (10:9): One who brought wheat to another to grind for him, and the miller did not wet the grains sufficiently for the grinding to be performed effectively, and as a result he converted the grain into bran or coarse bran; or if one gave flour to the baker and he made bread that is underbaked and tends to crumble; or if one gave an animal to a butcher and the butcher killed it in a way that rendered it an unslaughtered animal carcass, the worker is liable, because he is like a paid bailee. This indicates that even if the work was done for free, the worker has the legal status of one who is paid, and he is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara answers by emending the baraita: Say instead: Because he is a paid bailee and actually receives payment.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain animal that was slaughtered with an incision not in the neck that was brought before Rav. He declared it non-kosher, and exempted the butcher from paying its value. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi encountered that man, i.e., the owner of the animal, and they said to him: Rav did two for you.

The Gemara asks: What are the two? If we say there were two unfavorable rulings, what are they? One is that he should have declared the animal kosher, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that an animal that has been slaughtered in this manner is kosher, and instead he declared it non-kosher, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that it is not kosher. And the second is that even if he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, he should have ruled that the butcher is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara challenges this explanation: But if these are the two that Rav Kahana and Rav Asi are referring to, is it permitted for them to say this type of statement to the owner of the animal?

But isn’t it taught in a baraita that when a judge leaves the courthouse, he should not say to the litigant: I found you innocent and my colleagues found you liable, but what can I do, since my colleagues outnumber me? And it is concerning a circumstance such as this that it is stated: “He that goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets; but he that is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13).

Rather, the intention is that they told him that there were two favorable rulings: First, that by declaring the animal to be non-kosher, he did not allow you to eat an item about which there is uncertainty as to whether it is forbidden, and second, by exempting the butcher from paying you, he prevented you from being in a situation where there is uncertainty as to whether receiving payment from the butcher constitutes robbery, since you would have been given the butcher’s money when he may be exempt, as the animal may in fact be kosher.

§ The Gemara continues the discussion of an expert who erred, thereby causing a loss. It was stated: With regard to one who presents a dinar to a money changer to assess its value or authenticity and the money changer declares it valid, and it is found to be bad, i.e., invalid, causing its owner a monetary loss, it is taught in one baraita that if the money changer is an expert, he is exempt, while if he is an ordinary person he is liable. And it is taught in another baraita that irrespective of whether he is an expert or whether he is an ordinary person, he is liable to pay for the owner’s loss.

To reconcile the baraitot, Rav Pappa said: When the baraita teaches that an expert is exempt from liability, it is referring to renowned experts such as the money changers Dankhu and Issur, whose expertise is so great that they do not need to learn about assessing currency at all. The Gemara asks: But if they are so proficient, in what did they err? The Gemara answers: They erred with regard to a coin from a new press, which at that time was leaving the press, and they did not know its value.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who presented a dinar to Rabbi Ḥiyya to assess its authenticity. He said to her: It is a proper coin. The next day she came before him and said to him: I presented it to others, and they told me that it is a bad dinar, and I am not able to spend it. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: Go exchange it for her, and write on my tablet [apinkasi]: This was a bad transaction, as I should not have assessed the coin.

The Gemara asks: But what is different about Dankhu and Issur, who are exempt due to the fact that they do not need to learn about assessing currency? Rabbi Ḥiyya too did not need to learn, as he was also an expert. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Ḥiyya was not actually required to return a dinar to this woman, but when he did so he acted beyond the letter of the law. This is as that which Rav Yosef taught concerning the verse: “And you shall show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must do” (Exodus 18:20): “And you shall show them”; this is referring to

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 99b explores betrothal through a loan versus wages, weighing whether a jewel or the debt itself serves as valid betrothal money.