Talmud - Bava Kamma 73b בבא קמא ע״ג ב׳

are not like one testimony of continuous speech, but are considered separate testimonies, and therefore the testimony concerning the theft remains valid. And Rabbi Yosei maintains that the legal status of a pause within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and therefore the testimony about the theft is disqualified together with the testimony concerning the slaughter.

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yosei really maintain that the legal status of a statement interrupted or retracted within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech? But didn’t we learn otherwise in a mishna (Temura 25b): If one designates an animal by saying: This animal is hereby a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering, he has issued two contradictory statements and therefore this animal is considered a substitute for a burnt-offering, i.e., only the first part of his statement is accepted. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: If he intended this outcome from the outset, that the animal should serve both as the substitute of a burnt-offering and as the substitute of a peace-offering, since it is impossible for one to call it by two names at once, i.e., the only way he can make his intent known is by issuing these two apparently contradictory declarations consecutively, his statement stands, and the animal has the status of both a substitute for a burnt-offering and a substitute for a peace-offering. But if he said: This animal is a substitute for a burnt-offering and then changed his mind and said: A substitute for a peace-offering, it is a substitute for a burnt-offering.

And we discussed this ruling: If he changed his mind before saying: A substitute for a peace-offering, it is obvious that he cannot remove the status he already applied to the animal, and the animal certainly remains a substitute for a burnt-offering. Rabbi Yosei would not have issued such an obvious ruling.

And Rav Pappa said in response to this question: We are speaking of a case where the individual changed his mind within the time required for speaking a short phrase. Rabbi Yosei holds that when one adds to a statement after a pause, even if the addition was made within a short time, it is considered a separate statement, which does not reverse the initial declaration. This contradicts the explanation given for the baraita cited above, according to which Rabbi Yosei maintains that when one adds to an existing statement within the time required for speaking a short phrase it is considered continuous speech.

The Sages say in response: There are two time frames that are referred to as being within the time required for speaking a short phrase. One is the time required for a student to greet a rabbi, and the other one is the time required for the rabbi to greet a student. When does Rabbi Yosei hold that a statement added within the time required for speaking a short phrase is not considered continuous speech? When the words are added within the time required for a student to greet his rabbi using the phrase: Peace be upon you, my rabbi and teacher, as that is a long pause. By contrast, if the statement is added within the shorter time frame required for the rabbi to greet his student: Peace be upon you, Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that the added words constitute speech that is continuous with the original statement.

§ Rava says: Witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted by two other witnesses, and ultimately they, the first set of witnesses, were rendered conspiring witnesses, are killed, in accordance with the punishment for conspiring witnesses involved in a capital case, despite the fact that their testimony was already disqualified prior to the discovery of their conspiracy. The reason is that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, only the process has not yet been completed at the time of the contradiction.

Rava said: From where do I say that this is so? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:3) that if witnesses say: We testify with regard to so-and-so that he blinded his Canaanite slave’s eye and afterward knocked out his tooth, and therefore the master is obligated to pay him compensation for the value of his tooth, as that is what the master says, i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the master, and subsequently they were found to be conspiring witnesses, they pay the value of an eye to the slave.

Rava explains that the baraita as written is problematic: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that it is exactly as it is taught in the baraita, i.e., that there is no other set of witnesses other than those whose statement is quoted in the baraita and the opposing set of witnesses who establish them as conspiring witnesses, several problems arise: First, why should they pay the value of an eye to the slave? After emancipating him by testifying that his master has blinded him, should they be required to pay him the value of his eye?

And furthermore, they should be required to pay the value of the entire slave to the master, as they intended to cause him to lose ownership of his slave through their false testimony. And furthermore, why does the baraita say: As that is what the master says, i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the master. Is it really satisfactory to the master that his slave be emancipated as a result of this testimony?

Rather, it must be that this case involves another, competing, testimony that is not mentioned in the baraita. Is it not correct to say that the baraita is dealing with a case where prior to the testimonies mentioned in the baraita two other witnesses came and said: The master first knocked out the slave’s tooth and then blinded his eye, in which case the master is required to emancipate the slave and also to give him the value of his eye; and then an intermediate set of two witnesses came and said the testimony quoted in the baraita, that first the master blinded the slave’s eye and then knocked out his tooth? According to this account the master would still be required to emancipate the slave, but he would be required to give him only the value of his tooth, which is much less than the value of an eye. In this case the testimony of the first set of witnesses contradicts the testimony of the intermediate ones.

And this is the meaning of the clause: As that is what the master says, i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the master. It means that what the intermediate witnesses say, i.e., that he owes the value of a tooth, is satisfactory to him, as according to the claim of the first set, he owes the value of an eye. Since there are now contradictory testimonies, the testimony stating the claim of a loss of lesser value is accepted, and in that case the master would have to pay the slave only for the value of his tooth, in addition to emancipating him. This judgment corresponds exactly to the testimony of the intermediate set of witnesses.

And the baraita subsequently teaches: And then the intermediate set of witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, as a third set of witnesses testified that the intermediate set was not at the scene of the incident at all. Therefore, the intermediate set of witnesses pays the value of an eye to the slave less the value of a tooth, as this is the amount of monetary damage the slave stood to incur as a result of their testimony.

Rava concludes his proof: Learn from the baraita that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony. Although the testimony of the intermediate set of witnesses had already been contradicted before it was shown to be conspiring testimony, nevertheless, they can still be established as conspiring witnesses at that later stage, which means that they must pay an amount equivalent to the loss they were attempting to cause through their testimony.

Abaye said: No. There is another possible interpretation for the baraita, which answers the questions raised above and yet does not serve as proof for Rava’s opinion. According to this interpretation, the contradictory testimony was given after, not before, the testimony mentioned in the baraita.

It is possible that the baraita is discussing a case where a second set of witnesses both reversed the order of events, by testifying that the tooth was knocked out before the blinding of the eye, and at the same time rendered the first set witnesses as conspiring witnesses, by testifying that those original witnesses were not at the scene of the supposed events they claimed to have witnessed. It can be argued, albeit in a far-fetched manner, that the testimony of the first set of witnesses is considered to be to the master’s advantage even at this stage, because he knows what really happened, as reflected in the testimony of the later witnesses. Accordingly, Rava maintains that there are a total of three sets of witnesses in the case of the baraita, while Abaye says that there are only two sets.

Abaye elaborates: From where do I say that my interpretation of the baraita is correct?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 73b examines Rabbi Yosei's view on whether a brief pause counts as continuous speech, applied to testimony validity and substitute-offering declarations.