Talmud - Sotah 46a סוטה מ״ו א׳

And the priests recite: “Forgive, Lord, Your people Israel, whom You have redeemed, and suffer not innocent blood to remain in the midst of Your people Israel” (Deuteronomy 21:8). They did not have to recite the conclusion of the verse: “And the blood shall be forgiven for them,” as this is not part of the priests’ statement, but rather the Divine Spirit informs them: When you shall do so, the blood is forgiven for you.

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s statement that the heifer is not disqualified by a blemish, the Gemara suggests: And a blemish should disqualify in the case of the heifer, by means of an a fortiori inference: And if in the case of the red heifer, which is not disqualified by years, as it may be of any age, and yet a blemish disqualifies it, then a heifer for this ritual, which is disqualified by years, as it is valid only until two years of age, is it not logical that a blemish should disqualify it? The Gemara answers: It is different there, in the case of the red heifer, as the verse states: “Wherein [bah] has no blemish” (Numbers 19:2). This serves as an exclusion and teaches that it is only with regard to it [bah] that a blemish is disqualifying, but a blemish is not disqualifying with regard to the heifer of the ritual of the breaking of the neck.

The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, if the word “bah” precludes a derivation by an a fortiori inference, then any other labor performed with the red heifer, apart from pulling a yoke, should not disqualify it. While the verse disqualifies a red heifer only if it pulled a yoke, as it states: “And upon which never came a yoke” (Numbers 19:2), a similar a fortiori inference could be learned from the heifer whose neck is to be broken to disqualify a red heifer that has performed any labor. However, since the verse states with regard to the heifer whose neck is to be broken: “That has not been worked with [bah]” (Deuteronomy 21:3), this indicates that labor is disqualifying only for “bah,” a heifer whose neck is to be broken, but not for a red heifer.

Why, then, does Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: If he placed a bundle [uda] of sacks on a red heifer, the heifer is immediately disqualified from being used as the red heifer; and as for the heifer whose neck is broken, it is not disqualified by such labor until it pulls and moves the burden, as the verse states: “That has not pulled a yoke” (Deuteronomy 21:3). Why does bearing the weight of the bundle disqualify the red heifer? The Gemara explains: The halakha with regard to the red heifer is different, as we learn by a verbal analogy between the word “yoke” used with regard to the red heifer and the word “yoke” used with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken that any labor disqualifies the former.

The Gemara raises an objection: If there is a verbal analogy between the red heifer and the heifer that will have its neck broken, then the halakha that a blemish should disqualify the heifer whose neck is broken should also be derived from the usage of “yoke” with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken and from the usage of “yoke” with regard to the red heifer. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One has excluded this possibility by placing in the verse the word “bah,” which indicates that disqualification due to blemish applies only to the red heifer and not to the heifer whose neck is broken.

The Gemara counters this claim: In the verse concerning a heifer whose neck is broken, the Torah also writes “bah”; it should be the case that forms of labor other than pulling a yoke are disqualifying only with regard to it and not with regard to the red heifer. The Gemara answers: That word “bah” is required by Rav Yehuda in order to exclude sacred offerings, i.e., which are not disqualified by labor, and one may bring an animal that has been used for labor as an offering. It might enter your mind to say that this should be derived by an a fortiori inference from a heifer whose neck is broken, as follows: And if with regard to a heifer whose neck is broken, which is not disqualified by a blemish, labor nevertheless disqualifies it, then with regard to sacred offerings, which are disqualified by a blemish, is it not right that labor should disqualify them? In order to counter this argument, the word “bah” teaches us that a sacred offering is not disqualified by labor.

With regard to this suggested a fortiori inference, the Gemara observes that it can be refuted in the following manner: What about the fact that a heifer whose neck is broken is disqualified by years, as once it reaches two years of age it is no longer classified as a heifer? As it is clear that the heifer whose neck is to be broken carries some restrictions that do not apply to sacred offerings, perhaps being disqualified by labor is another such restriction. The Gemara refutes this argument: Is that to say that there are no sacred offerings that are disqualified by years? There are several offerings that may be brought only in their first or second year, and where the verse is necessary to teach that sacred offerings are not disqualified by labor, it is with regard to those sacred offerings that are disqualified by years.

The Gemara raises an objection: But is the halakha that sacred offerings are not disqualified by labor derived from this verse? It is derived from elsewhere. The verse states with regard to sacred offerings: “Blind, or broken, or maimed, or having a wart, or scabbed, or scurvy, you shall not offer these to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:22). This verse serves to create an exclusion, teaching that it is these that you may not sacrifice, but you may sacrifice sacred animals that have been used for labor. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state the halakha twice. It might enter your mind to say that this halakha, that one may sacrifice animals that have been used for labor, applies only in a case where they were used for permitted labor, but if they were used for prohibited labor, e.g., on Shabbat, you might say that it is prohibited to bring them as offerings. In order to refute this argument, it is necessary to state the halakha again.

The Gemara poses another question: But this halakha that prohibited labor does not disqualify offerings is also derived from here, a verse with regard to the sacrifice of blemished animals: “And from the hand of a stranger you shall not offer the bread of your God from any of these, because…there is a blemish in them” (Leviticus 22:25). This verse emphasizes that it is only “these,” i.e., blemished animals, that you may not sacrifice, but you may sacrifice sacred animals that have been used for labor. Since this verse is discussing the possibility of accepting offerings from a gentile, who presumably also performed prohibited labor with the animal, this demonstrates that prohibited labor does not disqualify animals from being sacrificed as offerings.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach this halakha a third time. It might enter your mind to say: This halakha, that labor does not disqualify offerings, applies only where one performed labor with them when they were non-sacred and afterward dedicated them as offerings, but if one performed labor with them when they were already sacred animals, you might say that it is prohibited to bring them as offerings. In order to refute this argument, it is necessary to teach this halakha in three separate places.

§ The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: If one placed a bundle of sacks on a red heifer, it is disqualified. And as for a heifer whose neck is broken, it is not disqualified until it pulls a burden. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: It states with regard to the red heifer: “That upon which never came a yoke” (Numbers 19:2). I have derived only a yoke; from where do I derive that other types of labor also disqualify the animal? You can say the following a fortiori inference: And if with regard to a heifer whose neck is broken, which is not disqualified by a blemish, other types of labor disqualify it, then with regard to a red heifer, which is disqualified by a blemish, is it not right that other types of labor should disqualify it?

And if it is your wish to say that this a fortiori inference is unsound, you can learn this halakha by a verbal analogy: It is stated here, with regard to the red heifer, “yoke” (Numbers 19:2), and it is stated there, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, “yoke” (Deuteronomy 21:3). Just as there, other types of labor disqualify it, so too here, in the case of the red heifer, other types of labor disqualify it.

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: If it is your wish to say? What potential problem with the a fortiori inference necessitates the verbal analogy? The Gemara explains: And perhaps you would say that the a fortiori inference can be refuted in the following manner: What is unique about a heifer whose neck is broken is that it is disqualified by years, which is not the case for a red heifer. Alternatively, one could suggest that sacred offerings will prove that this inference should not be made, as a blemish is disqualifying with regard to them, but labor is not disqualifying with regard to them.

As the a fortiori inference can be refuted in either of these ways, there is a need for the verbal analogy: It is stated here “yoke,” and it is stated there “yoke.” Just as there, in the case of a heifer whose neck is broken, other types of labor disqualify it, so too, other types of labor disqualify a red heifer. The Gemara raises an objection to this verbal analogy: And from the place that you came you can offer an alternative exposition: Just as below, in the case of a heifer whose neck is broken, it is not disqualified by carrying a burden until it pulls the yoke, so too here, a red heifer should not be disqualified until it pulls the yoke, contrary to the statement of Rav.

The Gemara answers the objection to the statement of Rav from the baraita: It is a dispute among tanna’im, as there are those who cite the source of this halakha, that labor disqualifies a red heifer, by verbal analogy from a heifer whose neck is broken, and therefore the red heifer is disqualified only if it pulls the burden. There are also those who cite the source of this halakha from a red heifer itself, and consequently they disqualify the red heifer even if it did not pull the yoke.

This is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to a red heifer: From the term “yoke” I have derived only that a yoke disqualifies a red heifer; from where do I derive the other types of labor? The verse states: “That upon which never came a yoke” (Numbers 19:2). The verse could be read with a pause after the word “came,” which would teach that it is disqualified in any case, no matter what labor was performed with it. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “yoke,” if all forms of labor disqualify it? It teaches us that a yoke placed on the animal disqualifies it whether the yoke was on the animal at the time of performing labor or whether it was on the animal not at the time of performing labor, i.e., it was merely placed on the animal. However, other types of labor actions disqualify animals only at the time of actually performing labor. Rav ruled in accordance with this opinion.

The Gemara raises an objection: And perhaps one can say a different exposition of the verse: “That upon which never came” is a generalization that disqualifies the animal after any type of labor, while “yoke” is a detail. There is a generalization and a detail, and the principle of halakhic exposition in that case is that there is nothing in the generalization other than what is in the detail. Therefore, with regard to a yoke, yes, it will disqualify an animal from being used as a red heifer; but with regard to anything else, no, it will not disqualify the animal. The Gemara answers: “That upon which never came” is an amplification, and the addition of this term results in this verse not belonging to the category of generalizations and details.

The Gemara comments: And a case like this is also taught in a baraita with regard to a heifer whose neck is broken: From the word “yoke” I have derived only that a yoke disqualifies; from where do I derive the other types of labor? The same verse states: “That has not been worked with” (Deuteronomy 21:3), to teach that it is disqualified in any case, no matter what labor was performed with it. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “yoke”? It serves to teach us that a yoke placed on the animal disqualifies it whether the yoke was on the animal at the time of performing labor or whether it was on the animal not at the time of performing labor, i.e., it was merely placed on the animal, whereas other types of labor actions disqualify animals only at the time of actually performing labor.

The Gemara raises an objection: And perhaps one can say a different exposition of the verse: “That has not been worked with” is a generalization that disqualifies the animal after any type of labor, while “yoke” is a detail. There is a generalization and a detail, and the principle of halakhic exposition in that case is that there is nothing in the generalization other than what is in the detail, which means: With regard to a yoke, yes, it will disqualify an animal, but with regard to anything else, no, it will not disqualify it. The Gemara answers: The phrase “that has not been worked with” is an amplification, and the addition of this term results in this verse not belonging to the category of generalizations and details.

Rabbi Abbahu said: I asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This pulling of a yoke that disqualifies a heifer whose neck is broken, with how much, i.e., how far, must the animal pull the yoke for it to be disqualified? He said to me: Like the measure of the size of a full yoke. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this mean according to its length or according to its width? One of the Sages, and Rabbi Ya’akov was his name, said to them: It was explained to me personally by Rabbi Yoḥanan himself: The pulling of a yoke is according to its width, which is a handbreadth.

The Gemara poses a question: And since he stated a fixed measurement, let him merely state: A handbreadth. Why was it necessary to add that this is the width of a yoke? The Gemara answers: This teaches us that the measure of a yoke along its width is a handbreadth. What difference is there in knowing this fact? This teaches that in the case of commercial transactions, a buyer may retract his purchase if the yoke he was given is less than a handbreadth wide.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Shaul says: For what reason did the Torah say to bring a heifer whose neck is broken to a stream? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Let something that did not produce fruit, i.e., a heifer that has not given birth, come and have its neck be broken at a stream that flows forcefully, which is a place that does not produce fruit, and atone for the murder of one who was not given an opportunity to produce fruit. The Gemara asks: What is this fruit that he was not given an opportunity to produce? If we say it refers to being fruitful and multiplying, i.e., that the killer prevented him from having more children, but if that is so, in the case of an elderly person or a eunuch, so too will you say that we do not break the heifer’s neck because they could not have had any more children even had they lived? Rather, the fruit are mitzvot, as the killer deprived the victim of the opportunity to perform additional mitzvot.

The mishna taught: And they bring it down to a stream that is eitan. Eitan in this context means as the word generally indicates, forceful. The Sages taught: From where is it derived that eitan is forceful? It is as it is stated:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Sotah 46a explores whether a blemish disqualifies the heifer in the neck-breaking ritual, comparing its laws to those of the red heifer.