Talmud - Ketubot 70b כתובות ע׳ ב׳

it is considered as though he were in fact saying to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And if it is so, i.e., that the halakha is in accordance with that statement that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: A wife may say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings, then when she says: That which I perform for the benefit of your mouth will be forbidden like an offering [konam], why does he not need to nullify the vow? Here too, let us say: Since she is able to say: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, it is considered as though she were in fact saying to him by her vow: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, and he should therefore have to nullify the vow.

Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous interpretation in favor of the following: Do not say it is considered as though he said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he explicitly says to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if he provided for her sustenance by instructing her to spend her own earnings, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a situation where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs. Therefore, the husband must appoint a trustee to provide the balance. The Gemara asks: If it is a case where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs, our difficulty is restored to its place: How can he prohibit her from benefiting from him if he is under a prior obligation to provide for her? Rav Ashi said: The mishna is referring to a case where her earnings are enough for large things, i.e., her basic requirements, but not enough for small things.

The Gemara asks: With regard to these small things for which her earnings are not enough, what are the circumstances? If the discussion involves a case where she is accustomed to them, then she is accustomed to them and they are equivalent to all other necessities, which he must provide. And if she is not accustomed to them, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where she was accustomed to such small provisions in her father’s house, but she agreed to marry him and lower her lifestyle, and she had, until now, abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with him. For she says to him: Until now, when you did not vow to render it prohibited for me to benefit from you, I abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with you. However, now that you have vowed, I can no longer abide the lesser lifestyle and remain with you, and therefore I wish to revert to the conditions of my father’s house.

The Gemara poses a question: And what is different about the time period mentioned in the mishna: Up to thirty days? The Gemara answers: If up to thirty days have passed, this is a short enough amount of time that people do not hear about her, and the matter of her receiving her sustenance through an intermediary is therefore not demeaning for her. However, if the vow lasts longer than this, people do hear about her, and the matter is demeaning for her. The husband must therefore decide if he wants to divorce her or sustain her in the appropriate fashion.

The Gemara suggests an alternative answer: If you wish, say that the husband is under no obligation to sustain her because the case discussed in the mishna was where he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman, and therefore he was not yet duty-bound to provide her with sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled by this explanation: Does a betrothed woman have any right to sustenance from her husband at all? The Gemara answers: The circumstance referred to is when the arranged time for the marriage had arrived and they had not yet gotten married. As we learned in a mishna (57a): If the time arrived and they had not yet gotten married, such women may eat food from his property, and if their husbands were priests they may partake of teruma.

The Gemara asks: But if so, what is different if the vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days or longer? The Gemara answers: For up to thirty days, the agent will carry out his agency effectively and take proper care of her needs. If the vow lasts longer, the agent will not fully carry out his agency but will begin to neglect her, until she cannot bear the situation any longer.

And if you wish, say that he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman and she subsequently married him, and therefore he is obligated to provide her sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled: If she married him after his vow, she considered the matter and accepted it upon herself. Why then is he forced to divorce her? The Gemara answers: The case is when she says: I thought that I could accept this manner of living, but now I see that I cannot accept it.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: You can say that we say so, that if either the husband or the wife suffers from a physical blemish, the other can demand a divorce even after agreeing to the marriage under these conditions. This is with regard to blemishes, but with regard to sustenance can we say so? Rather, it is clear as we initially answered: The mishna discusses either a case where he told her to support herself from her own earnings and she had accepted a lower standard of living while she was with him, or a case where he took the vow when she was betrothed, and now the appointed time for the marriage has arrived and they have not yet gotten married.

§ The mishna states that if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days he must appoint a trustee to provide sustenance to his wife. The Gemara is puzzled by this ruling: And does a trustee not perform the husband’s agency? If through his vow he has rendered it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, how can he provide for her through the trustee? An action performed by an agent is considered to have been performed by the principal. Rav Huna said: The trustee discussed in the mishna was not actually appointed as an agent. Rather, the mishna is referring to one who says in general terms: Whoever sustains my wife will not lose out. Thus, anyone who complies does so of his own choice, although the husband will later compensate him. Therefore, the wife is not benefiting directly from the husband.

The Gemara poses a question: And when a husband says this, is the one who responds not performing the husband’s agency? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 66a): With regard to one who was cast into a pit and said that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife, saying this out of concern that he might not be rescued and that she would not be able to remarry or would be required to enter into levirate marriage, those who heard him should write and give her a bill of divorce? This ruling indicates that they are considered his agents based on his instructions, as otherwise they would not be able to write a bill of divorce on his behalf. The similarly formulated statement here should therefore also endow the trustee with the status of an agent.

The Gemara refutes this claim: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he says that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce, which is a command, and therefore those who hear him are considered his agents. Here, however, does he say that anyone should sustain his wife? He merely says: Whoever sustains her will not lose out, which is a general statement.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rabbi Ami said: In the case of a fire that broke out on Shabbat, the Sages permitted him to say in the presence of gentiles: Whoever extinguishes this fire will not lose out. From this it can be inferred that the phrase: In the case of a fire, comes to exclude what? Does it not exclude a case like this? It would seem that it was only in the case of a fire, when there are several extenuating factors, that the Sages permitted the use of such an expression without treating it as the appointment of an agent. The Gemara refutes this: No, this ruling serves to exclude other prohibitions of Shabbat.

Rabba raised an objection from a mishna (Nedarim 43a): In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, if the one who made the vow wants to help him but is unable to do so due to the vow, he may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper subsequently gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this person who approached him. Rabba infers: This method of indirectly hinting is what is permitted, but he may not say: Whoever sustains the man will not lose out, as a declaration of that kind would make the storekeeper his agent.

The Gemara refutes this claim: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and he means the following: It is not necessary to say that he is permitted to say in general terms: Whoever sustains so-and-so will not lose out, as by doing so he is speaking to everyone and therefore does not appoint a specific agent. But this storekeeper, since the one who took the oath is familiar with him and he goes and says this to him, might be considered like the one who said to him: Go, give him yourself. The mishna therefore teaches us that since the one who made the vow did not issue an explicit command, the storekeeper is not considered his agent.

§ Since it mentioned the above case, the Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, the one who took the vow may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this one who approached him. Similarly, if the subject of the vow needed someone to build his house, or to erect his fence, or to reap his field, and the one who took the vow wants to help him, he should go to workers with whom he is familiar and say to them: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. They subsequently perform work for the subject of the vow, and they come and take their wages from this person who spoke to them.

If the two were walking along the way, and the one prohibited from benefiting from the other does not have anything with him to eat, the one who took the vow may give food to a different person as a gift, and this one takes it and eats, and this arrangement is permitted, as he did not give the food directly to him. And if there is no other person there apart from the two of them, he should place the items on a rock or on a fence and say: They are hereby declared ownerless for anyone who wants them, and this one takes the food items and eats them, and this too is permitted. But Rabbi Yosei prohibits this practice. Rava said: What is the reason for this ruling of Rabbi Yosei? It is a rabbinic decree due to

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 70b examines a wife's vow restricting benefit from her husband, exploring spousal support obligations and whether he must nullify such vows.