Talmud - Yoma 63b יומא ס״ג ב׳

If it would have mentioned just the word offering, I would derive that one is liable even for slaughtering animals consecrated for Temple maintenance outside the Temple, which are also called offering, as it is stated: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has found: Articles of gold, armlets, and bracelets, rings, earrings, and pendants” (Numbers 31:50). Therefore, the verse states: “And has not brought it to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4), to teach that with regard to any animal fit to be sacrificed within the entrance to the Tent of Meeting or the Temple, one is liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple. Conversely, with regard to any animal that is not fit to be sacrificed within the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple.

Furthermore: I might exclude these animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not fit to be sacrificed within the entrance to the Tent of Meeting because they are blemished, and I will not exclude the heifer of a purification offering and the scapegoat, which are fit to come to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting. Therefore, the verse states “to the Lord” to indicate that one is liable only for those animals that are designated exclusively for God as offerings. These, the heifer of a purification offering and the scapegoat, are excluded, as they are not designated exclusively for God as sacrificial offerings but are used for some other purpose.

The Gemara asks about this halakhic midrash: Does the expression “to the Lord” come to exclude? The Gemara raises a contradiction based upon the verse: “When a bull, or a lamb, or a goat, is born it shall be seven days under its mother; but from the eighth day on it may be accepted as an offering by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27). An offering by fire to the Lord: These are offerings by fire, which are sacrificed on the altar and which may not be sacrificed before their proper time.

From where do we derive that he may not consecrate an animal when it is lacking time, i.e., before the eighth day? The verse states: An offering, which indicates that it should not be designated as an offering before the eighth day. The expression: To the Lord comes to include the scapegoat, which is also brought for the sake of God. In other words, the expression: To the Lord, not only does not exclude the scapegoat from the category of offerings, but specifically includes it in this category.

Rava said that this can be resolved as follows: There the expression is understood in the context of the verse and here it is understood in the context of the verse. There, with regard to consecrated animals slaughtered outside the Temple, where the phrase: To the entrance, in that same verse comes to include other offerings, the phrase: To the Lord necessarily comes to exclude. Conversely, here, with regard to consecrating animals before the proper time, where the phrase: Offering by fire comes to exclude, the phrase: To the Lord comes to include.

Once the contradiction has been reconciled, the Gemara challenges the reasoning of the argument. The reason the scapegoat may not be consecrated before it is eight days old is because the Merciful One specifically included it among the other offerings. But had it not included it I would have said: The scapegoat may be consecrated even when it is lacking time. However, this is difficult: Isn’t it true that the lottery establishes as the goat that is sacrificed to God, only one that is fit to be sacrificed to God? Since it is not known in advance which goat will be designated for this purpose, both goats must be eight days old and thereby fit to be sacrificed to God.

Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, as it was taught in a baraita that Ḥanan the Egyptian says: Even if the goat sacrificed to God has already been slaughtered and its blood has been collected in the cup, if the scapegoat dies, he brings another goat as a counterpart and pairs it with the goat that has already been slaughtered. Since in this case the priest need not draw new lots and the second goat is immediately designated to be sent to Azazel, it was necessary to teach that this goat must not be lacking time.

The Gemara presents a challenge with regard to this answer. Say that you heard Ḥanan the Egyptian say that he does not hold that if the scapegoat dies, the blood of the other goat is rejected. Did you also hear him say that he does not require a new lottery for the second goat? Perhaps he meant that one brings two new goats and draws lots, and whichever is designated to be sent to Azazel is the counterpart to the goat that was already slaughtered.

The Gemara presents another explanation of why it was necessary for the Torah to indicate that the scapegoat must not be lacking time. Rather, Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a baraita: If one of the goats dies, he brings another goat in its place without a lottery; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, if the scapegoat would die, another goat would be designated as the scapegoat without a lottery, and it was necessary for the Torah to indicate that this goat had to be eight days old.

Ravina said that it is possible to answer according to all opinions. The derivation was necessary in a case where the scapegoat became blemished after the lottery and they redeemed it with another. In that situation, all agree that the new scapegoat does not need to be designated through a lottery, because the status of the original scapegoat was transferred to its replacement.

The Gemara asks: From where do you say that the scapegoat is disqualified by a blemish? A blemish disqualifies only a sacrificial offering, and the scapegoat is not a sacrificial offering. The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a baraita based upon the verse: “Blind, or broken, or maimed, or having a growth, or scurvy, or scabbed, you shall not offer these to the Lord, nor make an offering by fire of them upon the altar to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:22). The phrase: Nor make an offering by fire of them; these are the fats of blemished animals, which may not be sacrificed on the altar.

I have only derived that it is prohibited to sacrifice all the fats of a blemished animal; from where do I derive that it is prohibited to sacrifice some of them? The verse states “of them,” which indicates that the prohibition applies even to some of them. “The altar”; this is referring to the prohibition against sprinkling the blood of blemished animals. The phrase “to the Lord” comes to include the scapegoat, which is also disqualified by a blemish.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to write that a blemished scapegoat is disqualified and it is necessary to write that a scapegoat may not be lacking time. Since if the Merciful One had written only that a scapegoat is disqualified if it is lacking time, one might have said that this is because its time has not yet come and therefore it is unable to become consecrated. However, with regard to a blemished animal whose time has already arrived, say that it is not disqualified. And conversely, if the Merciful One had written only that a blemished scapegoat is disqualified, one might have said that this is because it is considered abhorrent to sacrifice a blemished animal as an offering. However, with regard to a goat that is lacking time, which is not abhorrent, say that it is not disqualified. It is therefore necessary for the Torah to include the scapegoat in both disqualifications.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yoma 63b examines which consecrated animals fall under liability for slaughtering outside the Temple, distinguishing sacrificial offerings from items designated for other purposes.