Talmud - Mo'ed Katan 13a מועד קטן י״ג א׳

in the case of one who slit the ear of a firstborn animal, the Sages penalized his son after him, that is because the prohibition is by Torah law. A firstborn animal is disqualified from sacrifice if it becomes blemished, rendering it permitted to be eaten as non-sacred meat. It is prohibited to deliberately engender a blemish in a firstborn animal, and one who does so is prohibited from eating the meat.

And if you might say that in the case of one who sold his slave to a gentile and then died the Sages penalized his son after him, that is because every day the slave is in the gentile’s possession precludes him from performing mitzvot. A Canaanite slave is obligated in the same mitzvot as a Jewish woman. If he is illicitly sold to a gentile and escapes, requiring the seller to compensate the gentile, the seller may not then re-enslave the slave, who is regarded as emancipated. The Sages extended this penalty to the owner’s heirs as well.

What, then, is the halakha here, where one planned from the outset to perform his work on the intermediate days of a Festival and then after performing the work he died? Should one say that the Sages penalized the man himself and he is no longer alive, or perhaps the Sages imposed a penalty on the money, such that no benefit may be derived from it, and it still exists in the hands of his heirs?

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: You already learned the answer to your question in a mishna (Shevi’it 4:2): A field whose thorns were removed during the Sabbatical Year may be sown in the eighth year, as removing thorns is not full-fledged labor that renders the field prohibited; but if it had been improved with fertilizer, or if it had been enclosed so that animals therein would fertilize it with their manure, it may not be sown in the eighth year. The Sages imposed a penalty that one not benefit from prohibited labor. And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: We have a tradition that if one improved his field in a prohibited manner and then died, his son may sow it. Apparently, the Sages penalized only him, the one who acted wrongly, but the Sages did not penalize his son. Here, too, with regard to work performed on the intermediate days of a Festival, the Sages penalized him, but the Sages did not penalize his son.

Abaye said: We have a tradition that if one rendered impure another’s ritually pure items and died before paying, the Sages did not penalize his son after him and require him to pay for the damage. What is the reason for this? It is that damage that is not evident, i.e., that does not involve any physical change visible to the eye, is not considered damage by Torah law; nevertheless, the injured party suffers a loss, and the Sages penalized only him, but the Sages did not penalize his son.

MISHNA: One may not purchase houses, slaves, and cattle on the intermediate days of a Festival unless it is for the sake of the Festival, or to provide for the needs of the seller who does not have anything to eat.

GEMARA: Rava asked Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha with regard to wages for a worker who does not have anything to eat? Is it permitted to provide a poor worker with work on the intermediate days of the Festival? Rav Naḥman said to him: We learned this in the mishna: Or to provide for the needs of the seller, if he has nothing to eat. What is added by mentioning the condition that he has nothing to eat? Does it not add the case of wages and not only the case of one selling items he owns? Rava said to him: No, it is merely explaining what is meant by the needs of the seller.

Abaye raised an objection from a mishna (18b): Promissory notes may not be written on the intermediate days of a Festival, but if the lender does not trust the borrower and is concerned that without such a note he will be unable to collect, or if he has nothing to eat, he may write a promissory note. The Gemara elaborates: What is added here by the words: If he has nothing to eat? Are they not meant to add that a promissory note may be written for the sake of the wages of the scribe who draws up the document? Conclude from it that it is permitted to hire a worker who is in need of a livelihood even for work that would otherwise be prohibited on the intermediate days of a Festival.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection from a mishna (Pesaḥim 55a) that addresses the prohibition against performing labor on the eve of Passover: And the Rabbis say: The practitioners of only three crafts are permitted to perform labor until midday on Passover eve, and they are the tailors, the barbers, and the launderers, whose work is needed for the Festival. The baraita elaborates: The tailors may perform labor on Passover eve, as a layperson is permitted to sew in his usual manner during the intermediate days of the Festival. Since similar labor is permitted during the Festival, one may be lenient on Passover eve as well. The barbers and the launderers are permitted to work, as those who arrive from overseas or one who leaves prison are permitted to cut their hair and wash their clothes on the intermediate days of the Festival because they had no opportunity to do so prior to the Festival.

And if it enters your mind that paying wages to a worker who does not have anything to eat is permitted on the intermediate days of the Festival, then all other types of labor should also be permitted on the eve of Passover, as there is something similar permitted on the intermediate days of the Festival, namely, the wages paid to a worker who does not have anything to eat. Tailors are permitted to work on the eve of Passover because similar work is permitted during the intermediate days of the Festival. The payment of wages to a worker who does not have anything to eat on the Festival must be prohibited, as otherwise similar work, i.e., any work involving the payment of wages, would be permitted on the eve of Passover, which is not the case.

Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: If that is so, that one can derive halakhot in this manner, then building as well should be permitted on the eve of Passover, as a wall that tilts toward the public domain and is likely to fall may be demolished and rebuilt in the usual manner on the intermediate days of a Festival due to the danger posed to passersby. Since building under such circumstances is permitted on the intermediate days of a Festival, it should be permitted in general on the eve of Passover.

Ravina also strongly objects to this: If that is so, a scribe [lavlar] who draws up documents should be permitted to do so on the eve of Passover, as one may write betrothal deeds, bills of divorce, and receipts on the intermediate days of a Festival.

Rather, Rav Ashi said that Rav Sheshet’s original objection has no basis: Are you raising a contradiction between the halakhot of the intermediate days of a Festival and the halakhot of the fourteenth day of Nisan, i.e., the eve of Passover? They are not comparable, as the prohibition against labor on each is for a different reason: Labor is prohibited on the intermediate days of a Festival because it involves excessive exertion, and in a situation of significant loss the Sages permitted it. In contrast, the prohibition against labor on the fourteenth of Nisan is due to the need to prepare for the Festival, and especially the Paschal lamb. Whatever is needed for the Festival, e.g., the work of tailors and barbers, the Sages permitted, but whatever is not needed for the Festival, the Sages did not permit.

MISHNA: One may not move his possessions from house to house during the intermediate days of a Festival, but he may move them to his courtyard if that is necessary. One may not bring home utensils from the house of a craftsman after he has completed his work, but if one is concerned about them that if he leaves them in the craftsman’s house they are likely to be stolen, he may move them to another courtyard.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say in the first clause of the mishna that one may not move one’s possessions at all, even from one house to another? How is it that the mishna then permits moving objects from one courtyard to another in the second clause? Abaye said in explanation: In the latter clause we come to the case of moving objects from the house in his courtyard to that same courtyard.

The mishna states: And one may not bring home utensils from the house of a craftsman. Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us with the following question: We learned in the mishna that one may not bring home utensils from the house of a craftsman. And this raises a contradiction to another mishna (Pesaḥim 55b): One may take utensils to and bring them from the house of a craftsman, even if they are not needed for the sake of the Festival.

And we answered him: Here, the mishna that permits the practice is referring to the fourteenth of Nisan, the eve of Passover, and here, the mishna that prohibits it, is referring to the intermediate days of a Festival. And if you wish, say another explanation: Both this and that refer to the intermediate days of a Festival, but here, the mishna that prohibits the practice is referring to a case where he trusts the craftsman and is not concerned about his utensils being lost or stolen, whereas here, the mishna that permits taking utensils to and from the craftsman is referring to a case where he does not trust the craftsman.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

MoedKatan 13a explores whether rabbinic penalties for forbidden work on a festival transfer to heirs, comparing cases involving firstborn animals and slaves.