Talmud - Zevahim 35b זבחים ל״ה ב׳

derive instead as follows: But if he intended, with regard to the sacrificial portions of the bulls, to burn them beyond their designated time, the sacrificial portions themselves are rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for eating them. The flesh of the bulls is never rendered piggul.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Me’ila 9a): In the case of the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property from the time that they were consecrated. Once they were slaughtered, they are susceptible to being rendered disqualified for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through being left overnight without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled.

The Gemara derives: What, is it not referring to the flesh being left overnight, which would render it not valid? And conclude from the mishna that since the flesh is rendered disqualified by being left overnight, the flesh is also rendered disqualified by the intention to burn the sacrificial portions the next day, i.e., it is subject to piggul, which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar.

The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to leaving overnight the sacrificial portions of the offering, not the flesh. Likewise, only the sacrificial portions are rendered piggul by intent to eat them after their designated time. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: One who derives benefit from all of them by the place of the ashes where they are burned is liable for misuse of consecrated property until the flesh is completely scorched, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is also referring to the flesh being left overnight. The Gemara answers: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. The first clause is referring to the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar, and the latter clause is referring to the flesh.

Rabba raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar from a baraita: And these are portions of the offering that do not render an offering piggul, and they do not become piggul: The wool that is on the head of the lambs, the hair that is in the beard of the goats, the hide, the gravy, the spices that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, a tendon in the neck, the crop, the bones, the tendons, the horns, the hooves, the fetus, the placenta, the milk of sacrificial animals, and the eggs of doves.

The baraita continues: All of these do not render other items piggul in the case of intent to consume them after their designated time, and they are not rendered piggul, and one is not liable to receive karet for them, neither due to the prohibition of piggul, nor the prohibition of notar, nor the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. And one who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, since they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar.

Rabba explains: What, does the baraita not mean that all of these items do not render the offering piggul if one intends to partake of them beyond the designated time, and they are also not rendered piggul due to the rest of the offering having been rendered piggul? This includes the fetus and placenta, and is therefore not in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar that the rest of the offering does render them piggul.

The Gemara responds: No, it means that they do not render the offering piggul, and they are not rendered piggul due to themselves if one had intent to partake of them beyond the designated time. But such intent with regard to the offering can render them piggul. The Gemara asks: If so, concerning that which is taught in the latter clause: All of these do not render other items piggul and they are not rendered piggul, why do I also need this? Doesn’t it teach that they are not rendered piggul due to the rest of the offering?

The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning that the additional statement is necessary, then with regard to that which it says a third time: One is not liable to receive karet for them due to the prohibition of piggul, why do I also need this? Rather, the third statement does not teach an additional halakha, but since the tanna wants to teach that one is not liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition of notar and the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure, he taught the halakha with regard to piggul as well.

Here too, it can be explained similarly: Since the tanna wants to teach the halakha that one who offers up one of these items outside the Temple is exempt, he also taught: And all of these do not render other items piggul and they are not rendered piggul. It may be that the rest of the offering does in fact render them piggul, as Rabbi Elazar stated.

Rava says: We learn in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar in the mishna as well: One who slaughters sacrificial female animals with the intent to eat the fetus of those animals or their placenta outside their designated area has not rendered the offering piggul. And one who pinches doves, i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent to eat their eggs that are still in their bodies outside their designated area, has not rendered the offering piggul.

And then it is taught: One who consumes the milk of sacrificial female animals or the eggs of doves is not liable to receive karet for it due to the prohibition of piggul, nor due to the prohibition of notar, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. But it can be inferred that one who partakes of the fetus or placenta, which are not mentioned, is liable to receive karet due to the prohibition of piggul.

Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that here, they are rendered piggul due to the offering, and there, due to themselves, i.e., if he had improper intent concerning them, then they are not rendered piggul. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that it is so.

§ The baraita cited by Rabba is now discussed in a different context: We learned in a mishna there (84a) that if disqualified offerings are nevertheless brought upon the altar, they are removed, and blemished animals are also included in this halakha. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit, and if they were brought upon the altar they are not removed.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit only an animal with a blemish on the cornea of the eye and similar blemishes that are not noticeable, since they are valid in the case of birds. And in addition, this is the halakha provided that its consecration preceded its blemish, i.e., when the animal was consecrated it was still entirely fit.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female burnt offering that was brought upon the altar that since a burnt offering may be only a male animal, it is comparable to a case where its blemish preceded its consecration, since the disqualifying factor was there from the outset. Therefore, if it was brought upon the altar it must be removed.

Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to this from the baraita cited by Rabba: One who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, as they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar. But it can be inferred that if he were to sacrifice from the flesh of the mother of one of these outside the Temple, he would be liable. And how can you find these circumstances? It is only in the case of a female burnt offering. This is because with regard to a peace offering, which may also be from a female animal, its flesh is not burned on the altar but is eaten. Therefore, there would be no liability for sacrificing it outside the Temple.

Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Akiva holds with regard to a female burnt offering that if it ascended onto the altar it does not descend, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is that of Rabbi Akiva. This is because one is liable for sacrificing any offering outside the Temple that may be sacrificed on the altar, including one that was brought upon the altar inappropriately but is not removed. But if you say that with regard to a female burnt offering if it ascended the altar it must descend, and it entirely lacks the status of an offering fit to be sacrificed on the altar, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita?

The Gemara answers: Say that the inference should be as follows: One who offers up one of those items outside the Temple is exempt, but if he sacrificed from the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these, he is liable. This halakha can apply to both a sin offering and a peace offering, for which a female may be brought and whose sacrificial portions are burned on the altar.

The Gemara challenges: But the baraita teaches this halakha with the term: Of one of these, indicating that it is referring to one who sacrifices the flesh, and not the sacrificial portions alone. And the case of their mother is similar to that of them, and is therefore referring to sacrificing the flesh of the mother outside the Temple, and not the sacrificial portions. Rather, say as follows: One who offers up part of their sacrificial portions outside the Temple is exempt, but one who offered up some of the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these is liable.

MISHNA: If one slaughters the animal in order to leave its blood or its sacrificial portions for the next day, or to remove them outside the designated area, but not in order to sacrifice them the next day, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. In the case of one who slaughters the animal in order to place the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or in order to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or the blood that is to be placed

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 35b examines whether piggul status applies to the flesh or only the sacrificial portions of burnt bulls, debating disqualification through overnight leaving.