Talmud - Menachot 69a מנחות ס״ט א׳

that when we say the two loaves must come from the first fruits, the verse is referring to the new fruit crop grown this year? This is not so. Rather, we say that the two loaves must come from the first fruits sacrificed upon the altar this year. Therefore, even in Rabba’s case the two loaves cannot come from wheat, as the altar had already consumed from the fruit, i.e., the wheat used for the omer offering, of this year.

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to the two loaves that permit the bringing of first fruit, are all fruit that are budding at the time of the sacrifice permitted, or are only fruit that has gone through formation permitted? The Gemara asks: What is meant here by budding and what is the meaning of formation? If we say that this is referring to the budding of the fruit and the formation of the fruit, this is difficult: Now that it is taught (70a) that even in the case of the grain taking root prior to the bringing of the two loaves, that grain is permitted by their sacrifice, is it necessary to discuss the budding or formation of fruit, which corresponds to a later stage than the taking root of grain?

The Gemara answers: Rather, Rami bar Ḥama is referring to the budding of a fruit tree’s leaf and the formation of a fruit tree’s leaf. The question is whether the budding of the fruit tree’s leaves is like the taking root of grain, and therefore all the tree’s first fruit is permitted by the two loaves, or whether this budding is not similar to the taking root of grain, and therefore the tree’s fruit is not permitted by the two loaves. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises a dilemma: With regard to wheat kernels that one sowed in the ground, does the bringing of the omer offering permit them to be eaten or does the omer not permit them in consumption? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a case where the wheat kernel has already taken root prior to the bringing of the omer offering, we already learn this in a mishna. If it is referring to a case where the wheat stalk has not yet taken root, we already learn this in a mishna as well.

The Gemara cites the source for this claim. As we learned in a mishna (70a): If crops took root before the sacrifice of the omer offering, the omer permits them to be eaten. And if not, i.e., they took root only after the sacrifice of the omer offering, they are prohibited until the next omer is sacrificed the following year.

The Gemara explains: No, Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s dilemma is necessary only in a case where one reaped grain and sowed it again prior to the omer, and the time of the omer arrived and passed while the grain was in the ground but before it had taken root. And this is the dilemma that he raises: What is the halakha in such a case? Is it permitted to take these kernels and eat from them? Is their halakhic status considered like that of kernels cast into a jug, i.e., disconnected from the ground, and consequently the sacrifice of the omer offering renders their consumption permitted? Or perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, in which case their halakhic status is that of seeds that did not take root and are therefore prohibited.

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises another dilemma with regard to grains that were reaped and then sowed again: Does the halakha of exploitation apply to them in a case of a disparity of one-sixth between their sale price and their market value, which would render the exploiter obligated to refund the difference between the purchase price and the market value, or does the halakha of exploitation not apply to them? Since the halakhot of exploitation apply only to movable property, not to land, this matter depends on whether these grains are considered like detached movable property or whether they have been subordinated to the land.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that one said: I sowed six kav of grain in the field, and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five kav in it, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rava say: With regard to any item that is otherwise subject to the halakhot of exploitation, and it is sold by measure, or by weight, or by number, even if the disparity was less than the measure of exploitation in the transaction, the transaction is reversed. A disparity of one-sixth between the value of an item and its price constitutes exploitation only in cases where there is room for error in assessing the value of an item. In a case where the sale item is easily quantifiable, any deviation from the designated quantity results in a nullification of the transaction, even if the sale item in question is subordinate to the ground.

Rather, it is a case where the seller said: I cast kernels in the field as required, without quantifying the measure of the kernels that he cast, and witnesses came and said that he did not cast kernels in the field as required. Are they subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as the halakhic status of these kernels is like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are subject to the halakhot of exploitation? Or, perhaps the laborer subordinated them to the ground, in which case they have the status of land, which is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation.

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises yet another dilemma with regard to grains that were reaped and then sowed again. The halakha is that one does not take oaths with regard to claims on land. Consequently, if one admitted to part of a claim with regard to such grain, which generally obligates him in an oath, does he take an oath with regard to the kernels or does he not take an oath with regard to the kernels? Is their halakhic status like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are like movable property and one takes an oath with regard to them? Or, perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, and they are like land and one does not take an oath with regard to them. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises another dilemma: With regard to wheat kernels that are found in the dung of cattle, or barley kernels found in the dung of an animal, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: With regard to what issue was this dilemma raised? If we say it was with regard to their capacity to become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, we already learn this in a baraita, as it is taught: If one found wheat kernels in the dung of cattle or barley kernels in the dung of animals, they do not become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But if he collected them for eating, they do become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food.

The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rather, perhaps Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma is referring to the use of these kernels for meal offerings. The Gemara rejects this: It is obvious that they may not be used for meal offerings, as it is written with regard to those who offer inferior items to the Temple: “Present it now unto your governor; will he be pleased with you or show you favor? Says the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 1:8). Any item that one would not feel comfortable bringing to a governor or local ruler may certainly not be brought to the Temple.

The Gemara explains: No; it is necessary to raise the dilemma in a case where one collected these kernels and sowed them in the ground, and now he wants to bring meal offerings from them. What is the halakha? Is the reason one may not use them initially for meal offerings because they are disgusting, and since he sowed them again their disgusting quality has left? Or perhaps they were initially disqualified because they are considered weakened after having been digested by an animal. And if so, even the grains that have now grown after they were replanted are also weakened, like the kernels that gave rise to them. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

Rami bar Ḥama raises yet another dilemma: In the case of an elephant that swallowed an Egyptian wicker basket and excreted it intact along with its waste, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised?

If we say that the dilemma was raised with regard to a case where the wicker basket was ritually impure and the question is if its ritual impurity is nullified by the elephant swallowing it, we already learn in a mishna (Kelim 25:9): All vessels descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to finish it, it immediately assumes the halakhic status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure. Therefore, as the wicker basket remained intact without physical change, it is clear that it remains ritually impure.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to raise this dilemma in a case where the elephant had swallowed ends of palm leaves [hutzin] whole, and after the leaves were excreted one made them into an Egyptian wicker basket. The dilemma is as follows: Is this considered digestion, and therefore the basket prepared from the leaves is

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Menachot 69a examines when the two loaves and omer offering permit new grain and fruit, debating budding, root-taking, and stages of growth.