Talmud - Menachot 19a מנחות י״ט א׳

the priests,” the verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it and to the matter that succeeds it. Before mentioning the priests, the verse states the halakha of pouring the oil on the meal offering, and after mentioning the priests, it states the halakha of the removal of the handful. Therefore, a priest is required for each of these rites.

The Gemara questions this explanation: And does Rabbi Shimon hold that a verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it and to the matter that succeeds it? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). The term “with his finger” is interpreted as referring to the term “and the priest shall take.” This teaches that the collection of the blood shall be performed only with the right hand, since the term “finger,” when stated in the context of the sacrificial rites, always is referring to the finger of the right hand. The term “with his finger” is also interpreted as referring to the term “and put it.” This teaches that the placing of the blood on the altar shall be performed only with the right hand.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon said: But is the term hand stated with regard to the collection of the blood? Since the term hand is not stated with regard to the collection of the blood, only with regard to the placement of the blood, then even if the priest collected the blood with his left hand, the offering is fit.

And Abaye said: Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to whether a verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it and to the matter that succeeds it. The Rabbis hold that the term “with his finger” is referring to both to the term “and the priest shall take” that precedes it, and the term “and put it” that succeeds it. And Rabbi Shimon holds that a verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that succeeds it, but is not interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it. In that case, Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that the pouring of oil must be performed by a priest can no longer be ascribed to the opinion that the phrase “Aaron’s sons, the priests” should be interpreted as referring to the description of pouring the oil that precedes it.

Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon: The verse states: “And he shall pour oil upon it and put frankincense upon it. And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons, the priests” (Leviticus 2:1–2). He therefore employs the principle that the conjunction “and,” represented by the letter vav, adds to the previous matter, demonstrating that the rite of the pouring of the oil is to be performed by Aaron’s sons, the priests.

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Shimon hold that the letter vav adds to the previous matter? If that is so, then this would pose a problem with regard to that which is written: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord, and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall sacrifice the blood and sprinkle the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). The Sages infer from here that from the stage of the sacrificing of the blood, which begins with the collection of the blood, and onward, it is the mitzva exclusively of members of the priesthood. By inference, this teaches that the slaughter of the offering, which is performed earlier, is valid when performed by a non-priest. If according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon the letter vav adds to the previous matter, if the slaughter of the offering is performed by a non-priest, it should also be unfit.

The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the slaughter of an offering, it is different, as earlier the verse states: “And he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him. And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:4–5), associating the placing of the hands on the head of an offering, which is performed by the owner of the animal, with the slaughter of the offering. Therefore, just as the placing of the hands on the offering is performed by non-priests, so too, the slaughter of the offering is performed by non-priests.

The Gemara asks: If there is a juxtaposition of the placing of the hands and the slaughter of the animals, why not also say that just as the placing of the hands on the offering is performed only by the owner of the animal, so too, the slaughter of the offering may be performed only by the owner of the animal? The Gemara answers: You cannot say that, due to an a fortiori inference from the halakha of the sprinkling of the blood: And just as the sprinkling of the blood, which is the essential rite that enables the one who brings the offering to achieve atonement, does not require the owner to perform it, as the priests perform this rite on his behalf, with regard to the slaughter of the offering, which is not the essential rite that enables the one who brings the offering to achieve atonement, is it not all the more so clear that it does not need to be performed by the owner?

And if you would say that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible, and the owner may not sprinkle the blood as he is not a priest, but he may still be obligated to slaughter the animal, as this rite may be performed by a non-priest, the Merciful One revealed in the Torah in the context of the Yom Kippur service with regard to the High Priest: “And he shall slaughter the bull of the sin offering which is for himself” (Leviticus 16:11). By inference, from the fact that the verse specifies that here the High Priest, who is the owner of the offering, must perform the slaughter, it is clear that usually the slaughter does not require the participation of the owner.

§ Apropos the mishna’s list of rites that are not indispensable for the meal offering, the Gemara explains that Rav says: With regard to any sacrificial rite where the term law and statute are stated, they are stated only to teach that the absence of the performance of that rite invalidates the offering. The Gemara comments: It enters our mind to say that the two terms are both required for this principle to be in effect, as it is written with regard to a red heifer: “This is the statute of the law” (Numbers 19:2).

Before continuing its discussion of this principle, the Gemara presents a mnemonic for the questions that follow: Nun, tav, tzadi; yod, kuf, mem, lamed. They represent: Nazirite; thanks offering [toda]; leper [metzora]; Yom Kippur; offerings [korbanot]; meal offering [minḥa]; shewbread [leḥem hapanim].

The Gemara asks: But what of the offering of a nazirite, about which it is written only “law,” as the verse states: “This is the law of the nazirite who vows, and of his offering to the Lord for his naziriteship, beside that for which his means suffice; according to his vow which he vows, so he must do after the law of his naziriteship” (Numbers 6:21), and yet Rav says that the lack of waving of the offering by a nazirite invalidates the offering? The Gemara answers: There it is different, since it is written in the continuation of the verse: “So he must do,” and therefore it is considered as if the term statute were written with regard to it.

The Gemara asks: But what of the thanks offering, about which it is written only “law,” as the verse states: “This is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:11), and we learn in a mishna (27a) that with regard to the four types of loaves that accompany the thanks offering, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others? The Gemara answers: The thanks offering is different, since it is juxtaposed in the Torah to the offering of a nazirite; as it is written in a verse describing the thanks offering: “With the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving” (Leviticus 7:13), instead of simply stating: The sacrifice of his thanks offering. And the Master says: The term “his peace offerings” serves to include the loaves of the peace offering of the nazirite, to teach that the same halakhot apply to both.

The Gemara asks: But what of the offering of a leper, about which it is written only “law,” as the verse states: “This shall be the law of the leper” (Leviticus 14:2), and we learn in a mishna (27a) that with regard to the four species that are used in the purification process of the leper, i.e., cedar, hyssop, scarlet wool, and birds, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others? The Gemara answers: There it is different, since it is written: “This shall be the law of the leper.” Due to the added emphasis of the term “shall be,” it is considered as if the term statute were written with regard to it.

The Gemara asks: But what of Yom Kippur, about which it is written only “statute,” as the verse states: “And it shall be a statute for you forever” (Leviticus 16:29), and we learn in a mishna (27a) that with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the absence of each goat prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other? Rather, it must be that Rav meant that wherever either the term law or the term statute is employed, this signifies that the rite is an indispensable requirement.

The Gemara questions this understanding of Rav’s statement: But what of the rest of the offerings, as the term “law” is written with regard to them, and yet failure to perform all of their different rites does not invalidate those offerings? The verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). The Gemara answers: When the term law appears, it is still necessary for the term statute to appear, in order to teach that failure to perform the rites invalidates the offering. But when the term statute appears, it is not necessary for the term law to appear as well. The term statute is sufficient.

The Gemara questions this explanation: But doesn’t Rav say: Wherever the terms law and statute appear? Apparently, both are necessary for his principle to apply. The Gemara answers: This is what Rav is saying: Even in a context where the term law is written, if the term statute is written as well, then yes, failure to perform the rites invalidates the offering; but if the term statute does not accompany the term law, then failure to perform the rites does not invalidate the offering.

The Gemara questions this explanation: But what of the meal offering, as the term “statute” is written with regard to it, as the verse states: “Every male among the children of Aaron may eat of it, as a statute forever” (Leviticus 6:11), and yet Rav says: With regard to every sacrificial rite of the law of the meal offering that the verse repeats, as the details of the meal offering are discussed in Leviticus, chapter 2, and again in Leviticus, chapter 6, it is repeated only to teach that the failure to perform that rite invalidates the offering? Doesn’t this demonstrate that where the verse repeated the command, then yes, failure to perform the rite invalidates the offering; but if the verse did not repeat it, then failure to perform the rite does not invalidate the offering, whether or not the term statute appears?

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as when the term statute is written, it is written with regard to the eating of the meal offering rather than with regard to the sacrificial rites.

The Gemara asks: But what of the shewbread, where when the term statute is written, it is written with regard to the eating of the shewbread, as the verse states: “And they shall eat it in a holy place, for it is most holy to him of the offerings of the Lord made by fire, a perpetual statute” (Leviticus 24:9), and we learn in the mishna (27a): With regard to the two arrangements of the shewbread, failure to place each of the arrangements prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread, failure to place each of the arrangements prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the arrangements of the shewbread and the bowls of frankincense, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other.

Rather, it must be that anywhere that the term statute is written with regard to eating, it is written with regard to the entire matter, i.e., all the halakhot of the offering, and teaches that failure to perform the rites invalidates the offering.

The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the meal offering, it is different, and it is only the rites that are repeated that are indispensable, as the verse states: “Of its groats, and of its oil” (Leviticus 2:16), rather than simply: Of the groats and oil,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Menachot 19a examines whether a biblical phrase applies to both preceding and following clauses, debating priestly requirements for oil-pouring and handling sacrificial blood with the right hand.