Talmud - Bava Metzia 6a בבא מציעא ו׳ א׳

The Gemara asks: But if one who is suspected of theft cannot be administered an oath, that which Rav Naḥman says, that when a person denies a debt entirely the judges administer an oath of inducement to him, is difficult. Let us say that since he is suspect with regard to financial dishonesty, he is suspect with regard to taking an oath.

And furthermore, that which Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches in a baraita with regard to the case of the storekeeper and the laborer (see 3a), that both parties take an oath and take payment from the employer, is also difficult. Let us say there, too, that since he is suspect with regard to financial dishonesty, he is suspect with regard to taking an oath.

And furthermore, with regard to that which Rav Sheshet says: The judges administer three oaths to an unpaid bailee who claims that the deposit with which he was entrusted was stolen: I hereby take an oath that I was not negligent in safeguarding it; I hereby take an oath that I did not misappropriate the deposit; and I hereby take an oath that it is no longer in my possession, there is the same difficulty. Since the court raises these suspicions against the bailee, let us say that since he is suspected of financial dishonesty, he is suspected with regard to taking an oath. How can the court administer these oaths?

Rather, the conclusion from all of the above is that we do not say that since one is suspected of financial dishonesty, he is suspected with regard to taking an oath.

Abaye said: There is no proof from the three halakhot cited above that an oath is administered to one who is suspect with regard to financial dishonesty, as it can be explained that the reason the oath is administered in these cases is that we suspect that perhaps the defendant has an old loan that he lent to the plaintiff, and he has been unable to get his money back. He is therefore withholding or claiming ownership of the item or money of the plaintiff as repayment of the loan and not as an act of outright robbery. Therefore, an oath is administered to him.

The Gemara asks: If so, why does he take an oath in these cases? Let him take the item or money without taking an oath, as perhaps he is withholding it as repayment for an old loan, in which case the oath will not determine the truth in the dispute at hand.

Rather, Abaye’s suggestion should be understood as follows: We suspect that perhaps he is uncertain as to whether he has an old loan that he lent to the plaintiff. The defendant is unsure whether the plaintiff owes him money and is withholding the item just in case.

The Gemara asks: But why don’t we say in this case that if the defendant is capable of seizing another person’s property due to an uncertain debt, he may also take an oath falsely due to that same uncertainty? How is the oath administered to him?

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: People refrain from taking an oath about which they are uncertain but do not refrain from seizing property about which they are uncertain. What is the reason for this? People reason that property can be returned, but an oath cannot be retracted. If it is proven that his seizure of the property was unjustified, the defendant can return it. By contrast, once he takes a false oath, there is no remedy for the situation. Therefore, one is more cautious when taking an oath than when seizing property.

§ Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If two people together had a garment in their grasp and one of them seized it in its entirety from the grasp of the other in our presence, i.e., before the court, what is the halakha?

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the one from whom it was seized remained silent, his silence indicates that he admits to the one who seized it from him that he is the owner. And if he shouted in protest at the seizure, what more should he have done? The fact that the other person is stronger than him is irrelevant as far as determining legal ownership of the garment is concerned.

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise this dilemma in a case where he was silent initially, when the other litigant seized the garment, and he later shouted. What is the halakha? Is there an assumption that since he was initially silent, he admitted to the one who seized it from him that in seizing it the litigant became the owner, and it was only later that he regretted doing so and shouted? Or perhaps, since he is shouting now about the injustice that was done to him, the matter is revealed that the fact that he was silent initially was because he thought: The Rabbis of the court saw him grab it from me, so there is no need to cry out.

Rav Naḥman says: Come and hear a solution to the dilemma from what was taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement said that both of them take an oath and each receives half of the garment? It is said in a case where both of them are still holding the garment. But if the garment was in the possession of only one of them, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., the one not holding the garment. In the absence of proof, the item remains in the possession of the one holding the garment. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that it is to be understood as it is taught, it is obvious that one who claims an item that is in another’s possession must bring proof to support his claim. Rather, it must be referring to a case where one of them seized it in our presence, which is the case to which Rabbi Zeira referred.

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is possible that here we are dealing with a case where they came before us, the court, while both were holding the garment, and we said to them: Go divide the garment, and they left the court and afterward came back while one of them was holding it. This one, who was holding the garment, said: The other one admitted to me that I was justified in my claim. And that one, who was not holding the garment, said: I rented half of the garment to him for money and did not relinquish my right to it. In this case the latter person’s claim is not accepted, as we say to him: Until now you suspected him of being a robber, claiming that he took from you an item that you found, and now you rented it to him without witnesses? Therefore, the burden of proof rests upon the one who is not holding the garment.

And if you wish, say instead that it is possible to understand the case in the baraita as it is taught, i.e., they came before us while only one of them was holding the garment itself, but the other was hanging on to the edge of the garment. And the baraita teaches that even according to Sumakhos, who says that in a case of property of uncertain ownership the parties divide it without an oath, in this case Sumakhos concedes that hanging on to the edge is worth nothing. It does not render the ownership of the garment uncertain, and therefore the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., one who is hanging on to the edge.

Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma was not resolved, but the Gemara states a related halakha: If you say that if one seizes the garment in our presence the court removes it from his possession, then if either of the parties consecrated the entire garment to the Temple treasury, the consecration is not valid, as it is not his. But if you say that if one seizes the garment in our presence the court does not remove it from his possession, then if one of them consecrated the entire garment to the Temple treasury without seizing it, what is the halakha?

The two sides of this dilemma are as follows: Since the Master said a principle with regard to the halakhot of transactions that a declaration to the Most High is equivalent to a transfer to an ordinary person, i.e., verbal consecration of an item is equivalent to a formal act of acquisition in a non-sacred transaction, is the one who consecrated the garment therefore considered like one who seized it, and consequently the consecration takes effect?

Or perhaps the consecration does not take effect, as now, in any event, he did not actually seize the garment and it is not his? And it is written: “And when a man shall sanctify his house to be sacred unto God” (Leviticus 27:14), from which the Sages derive: Just as his house is in his possession, so too, anything that one wishes to consecrate must be in his possession, to the exclusion of this garment, which is not in his possession, as he did not actually seize it, and therefore the consecration does not take effect.

The Gemara attempts to answer the question: Come and hear proof from an incident that transpired, as there was a certain

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaMetzia 6a examines whether someone suspected of financial dishonesty can still be trusted to swear an oath, weighing cases like bailees and disputed wages.