Talmud - Bava Metzia 56a בבא מציעא נ״ו א׳

The reason one must employ this procedure is due to the fact that the Sages said: One desacralizes second-tithe silver coins upon copper coins under duress. And it is not that he will maintain them in that form; rather, it is that he again desacralizes them upon silver coins. In any event, the tanna teaches that one desacralizes second-tithe coins in this manner under duress, from which it may be inferred: Under duress, yes; not under duress, no. This is the halakha with regard to redemption of second-tithe coins by Torah law. By contrast, in the case of demai, which is by rabbinic law, Rabbi Meir permits desacralizing it in this manner ab initio. Apparently, Rabbi Meir is more lenient with regard to matters of rabbinic law than he is with regard to matters of Torah law.

Rav Yosef said: Although Rabbi Meir is lenient with regard to redemption of second-tithe demai, he is stringent with regard to its consumption. This is as it is taught in a baraita: The Sages permitted only a wholesaler to sell demai. Since a wholesaler acquires grain from numerous sources and sells large quantities, he would suffer significant loss if he were required to separate tithes each time. But in the case of a proprietor who purchased produce from an am ha’aretz, whether he purchased large quantities to sell in bulk or whether he purchased small quantities to sell little by little, he must tithe the produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

The baraita continues: And the Rabbis say: Both a wholesaler and a proprietor who sells in bulk may sell demai, or send it to another, or give it to him as a gift, and they need not be concerned. The one who receives the produce separates the tithes and consumes the remaining produce. In this baraita, Rabbi Meir was stringent with regard to the concern that someone will consume demai without the tithes being separated.

Ravina raises an objection from a mishna (Demai 5:3): One who purchases bread from a baker who is unreliable with regard to tithes [am ha’aretz] may tithe from warm bread for, i.e., to exempt, cold bread, and from cold bread for warm bread, and one may do so even if the bread is in different shapes from many molds; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Granted, one may tithe from cold bread for warm bread, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elai, as Rabbi Elai says: From where is it derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce that his teruma is teruma? It is as it is stated: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it the best thereof” (Numbers 18:32). The Torah warns the Levites not to separate teruma from low-quality produce. The question arises: If when one separates lower-quality produce, that produce is not sacred, why would one think that he bears sin? He did nothing. From here it is derived that although the Levite acted improperly, in the case of one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce, his teruma is teruma.

Rather, with regard to the halakha that one may tithe even if the bread is in different shapes from many molds, let Rabbi Meir be concerned lest the buyer come to tithe from the loaves that one is obligated to tithe for the loaves that one is exempt from tithing, or from the exempt for the obligated. Since these loaves are all demai, it is possible that the loaves shaped in one mold were baked from produce that was tithed and the loaves shaped in another mold were baked from produce that was not tithed. Apparently, Rabbi Meir rules leniently in cases of rabbinic law, e.g., demai.

The Gemara returns to discuss the difficulties raised above. Abaye said: The problem raised by Rabbi Elazar was legitimately difficult for him, and Shmuel did not legitimately responded to his difficulty by stating that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The reason the response is insufficient is that it was the case in the mishna of teruma of the tithe, which is punishable with death at the hand of Heaven, that was difficult for Rabbi Elazar, who was questioning whether the Sages reinforced their pronouncements concerning such a prohibition and rendered them parallel to Torah law; and Shmuel responded to him by citing Rabbi Meir’s opinion concerning a bill of divorce, which involves court-imposed capital punishment. Perhaps the case involving court-imposed capital punishment is different, as it is more stringent, and Rabbi Meir renders rabbinic law parallel to Torah law only in such a case.

Abaye continued: And Rav Sheshet does not legitimately raise an objection, as Rabbi Elazar and Shmuel are speaking about cases punishable by death, and Rav Sheshet raised his objection from a case involving a mere prohibition, as it is written with regard to second tithe: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil” (Deuteronomy 12:17). And to that which Rav Sheshet raised as an objection, Rav Yosef legitimately respond to his difficulty.

But as for Ravina, the question arises: Rather than raising an objection from this case of a baker, from which proof is cited that Rabbi Meir does not draw a parallel between rabbinic law and Torah law, let him cite support for the assessment of the opinion of Rabbi Meir from the case of a bread merchant [mipalter], as we learned in a mishna (Demai 5:4): One who purchases bread from a merchant tithes separately from the bread of each and every mold; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. In this case, Rabbi Meir is stringent with regard to demai.

Rather, what have you to say in explaining why Ravina did not cite a proof from this mishna? It is because a merchant purchases his supply from two or three people. Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that one must be concerned that perhaps one of the suppliers separated tithes and another did not, so the customer must separate tithes from the bread of each and every mold. But if that is the case, Ravina should not cite a proof from the case of the baker, as well; as the baker discussed in the mishna typically purchases his stock of grain from only one person. Therefore, in that case there is no concern that perhaps the customer will tithe from the loaves that he is exempt from tithing for the loaves that he is obligated to tithe.

Rava said: Shmuel responds well to that which was difficult to Rabbi Elazar, as the category of death in the world is one. Therefore, it is appropriate to cite proof from the case of court-imposed capital punishment to the case of death at the hand of Heaven.

MISHNA: These are matters that are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation even if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth or greater: Slaves, and documents, and land, and consecrated property. In addition, if they are stolen, these items are subject neither to payment of double the principal for theft nor to payment of four or five times the principal, if the thief slaughtered or sold a stolen sheep or cow, respectively. An unpaid bailee does not take an oath and a paid bailee does not pay if these items were stolen or lost. Rabbi Shimon says:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaMetzia 56a examines desacralizing second-tithe coins under duress versus willingly, contrasting Rabbi Meir's leniency and strictness regarding demai produce.