Talmud - Bava Metzia 51b בבא מציעא נ״א ב׳

But here, where he says: On the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me, does the other party know that there will be exploitation so that he will consciously waive his rights to claim compensation in the event that there is? He believes that perhaps there will be no exploitation at all.

And Shmuel says: I state my opinion even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as Rabbi Meir states his opinion only there, in the case of betrothal, where the husband definitely abrogates Torah law with his condition. But here, who says that either party to the sale will abrogate any Torah law?

Rav Anan says: This matter was explained to me personally by Mar Shmuel. In the case of one who says to another: I will be party to this sale on the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me, the other party does not have a claim of exploitation against him, as one can waive his rights to compensation for the exploitation that he suffered. But if one said: I will be party to this sale on the condition that it is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, it is subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as in this case it is directly counter to Torah law.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: In the case of one who conducts business on faith; and in the case of one who says to another: I will be party to this sale on the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me, the exploited party does not have a claim of exploitation against the one who exploited him. According to Rav, who said: I stated my opinion even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita, as pursuant to that statement, even Rabbi Yehuda holds that in cases of exploitation one cannot stipulate counter to that which is written in the Torah?

Abaye said: Based on this proof from the baraita it is clear that Rav stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that Shmuel stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this baraita expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rava said: It is not difficult, as there is a distinction between the cases. Here, in this baraita, the tanna is speaking in a case where the condition is stated in an ordinary case, where it is not stated explicitly that the price paid is not the market value. In that case, Rav says that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the condition is void. There, where Rabbi Yehuda would uphold the condition, the tanna is speaking in a case where the exploitation is explicit, i.e., both parties know that the price paid is not the market value.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement said? It is in an ordinary case, but in a case where the exploitation is explicit, e.g., in the case of a seller who said to the buyer: Concerning this item that I am selling to you for two hundred dinars, I know about it that it is worth only one hundred dinars, and I am selling it on the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me, the buyer has no claim of exploitation against him. And likewise, in the case of a buyer who said to the seller: Concerning this item that I am buying from you for one hundred dinars, I know about it that it is worth two hundred dinars, and I am buying it on the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me, the seller has no claim of exploitation against him.

Apropos the mention of one who conducts business on faith, the Gemara cites a baraita that teaches several halakhot concerning such an arrangement. The Sages taught: When selling merchandise that one purchased in bulk, one who conducts business on faith may not calculate the price of the merchandise of inferior quality on faith and the price of the merchandise of superior quality at their market value. Rather, he has two options: Either the price of both this merchandise and that merchandise must be calculated on faith, or the price of both this merchandise and that merchandise must be calculated at their market value.

The baraita continues: And the buyer gives the seller the payment for the money he spent in hiring a porter, the payment for the money he spent in hiring a camel driver if necessary, and the payment for the lodgings he used during the time of the transaction. These expenses had been borne by the seller, so it is not exploitation if he recovers them by charging the buyer. But as for the seller’s own wages, i.e., payment for the time he spent engaging in the transaction, he does not take his own wages, as the one from whom he purchased the merchandise already gave him his full wages.

The Gemara asks: With regard to his wages in full, from where did he give that to him? With what was he paid by the one from whom he purchased the merchandise? The Gemara responds: Rav Pappa said: This is referring to sellers of inexpensive garments, where the one from whom he purchases the merchandise gives four additional units for each one hundred units purchased, and that functions as payment for his efforts.

MISHNA: How much can the sela coin be eroded through usage, and its use in a transaction at its original value will still not constitute exploitation? Rabbi Meir says: The accepted depreciation is four issar, which is a rate of one issar per dinar, or one twenty-fourth of a dinar. And Rabbi Yehuda says: The accepted depreciation is four pundeyon, which is a rate of one pundeyon per dinar, or one-twelfth of a dinar. And Rabbi Shimon says:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaMetzia 51b examines whether waiving claims of price exploitation in a sale is valid, contrasting views of Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Meir on overriding Torah law.