Talmud - Pesahim 63a פסחים ס״ג א׳

The Gemara asks: Let us say that Aḥerim hold that slaughter is not legally significant until the end, meaning that the slaughter is considered to take place only at the end of the rite and not during the time it takes to perform the act of slaughter, in accordance with the opinion of Rava in a different context. As Rava said: It is still a dispute, meaning that the disagreement whether one is held accountable only for his first expression or also for the conclusion of his statement applies even when it is one’s clear intention that the status he wishes to confer should apply only at a particular time, e.g., if one says that an animal should be consecrated as a burnt-offering until midday and from then on as a peace-offering (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The opinion of Rabbi Meir, referred to here as Aḥerim, is that one is held accountable only for his first expression.

Therefore, based on these two assumptions, if one put the circumcised people before the uncircumcised people, his statement with regard to circumcised people applies but his statement with regard to uncircumcised people does not apply. If the slaughter is legally considered to take effect in a single instant, and if one said that his intention is for circumcised people at that moment, his statement takes effect. In the reverse case, if one put the uncircumcised people before the circumcised people, his statement with regard to uncircumcised people applies, but his statement with regard to circumcised people does not apply.

Rabba said: No, we should not say this. Actually, Aḥerim hold that slaughter is legally significant from beginning to end, and with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one decided in his mind to slaughter the offering for both of them, both circumcised and uncircumcised people, and he verbally expressed his intention with the phrase: For uncircumcised people, but did not have a chance to say: For circumcised people, before the slaughter was already finished as he was saying: For uncircumcised people. And it is with regard to this point that they disagree: Rabbi Meir, who is Aḥerim, holds that we do not require that one’s mouth and heart be the same; what is legally significant is his verbal expression. Since he said: For uncircumcised people, he has disqualified the offering. And the Rabbis hold that we require that his mouth and heart be the same. Since he wanted to express his intent for both circumcised and uncircumcised people, he has not disqualified the offering.

The Gemara expresses surprise: But does Rabbi Meir hold that we require that his mouth and heart be the same? The Gemara raises a contradiction based on a mishna in tractate Terumot that states: With regard to one who intended to say that the produce he has designated should be teruma, but he mistakenly said the word tithe; or he intended to say tithe but mistakenly said teruma; or he intended to vow: I will not enter this house, but mistakenly said: That house, i.e., he mistakenly referred to a different house; or he intended to vow: I will not derive benefit from this person, but he said: From that person, i.e., he mistakenly referred to someone else; he has not said anything until his mouth and heart are the same. This is an unattributed mishna, and unattributed mishnayot are presumed to be authored by Rabbi Meir.

Rather, Abaye said the following explanation: We are dealing with a case where the person expressed two different intentions within the act of slaughter itself, as valid slaughter involves cutting most of both the windpipe and the esophagus of the animal. The first clause is referring to a case where he said: I cut the first organ for circumcised people and the second organ even for uncircumcised people, so that in the second organ even circumcised people are included. Consequently, he had circumcised people in mind at each stage of the slaughtering. The latter clause is referring to a case where he said: I cut the first organ for uncircumcised people and the second organ for circumcised people, so that in the first organ circumcised people are not included, and his intent during that stage is solely for uncircumcised people.

And Rabbi Meir follows his own line of reasoning, as he says that piggul status can be conferred upon an offering at half of what renders it permitted. In other words, piggul status applies not only when one has a disqualifying intent during the entire act that renders the animal permitted, e.g., while slaughtering both the windpipe and the esophagus, but even if one has the disqualifying intent during half of the act that renders the animal permitted, e.g., while slaughtering one of those two organs. And the Rabbis also follow their regular line of reasoning, as they say that piggul status cannot be conferred at half of what permits it. Since he expressed his intent for both uncircumcised and circumcised people over the course of the entire act of slaughter, the offering is not disqualified.

MISHNA: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread still in his possession violates a negative commandment, as the Torah states: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the sacrifice of the festival of Passover be left until the morning” (Exodus 34:25). Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who slaughters the daily afternoon offering on Passover eve with leaven in his possession violates the commandment. Rabbi Shimon says: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb on the fourteenth of Nisan for its own purpose with leaven in his possession is liable; but if he slaughtered it for a different purpose he is exempt. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover eve, when owning leaven is prohibited, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is exempt.

And during the festival of Passover, if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for its own purpose he is exempt. Since a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered for its own purpose at an improper time is disqualified, it is not an offering at all and there is no violation of the commandment: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.” However, if he slaughtered it for a different purpose and thereby validated the sacrifice as a peace-offering, he is liable for having sacrificed it with leaven in his possession. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover, when it is prohibited to slaughter with leaven in one’s possession, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is liable. This is with the exception of a sin-offering that he slaughtered for a different purpose with leaven in his possession. Unlike other offerings, a sin-offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for a different purpose, and therefore one does not violate the prohibition of “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.”

GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One is never liable for having violated the commandment: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread” unless the leavened bread belongs to the one who slaughters the Paschal lamb, or to the one who sprinkles its blood,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Pesachim 63a examines when a Paschal sacrifice's slaughter legally takes effect, debating intent regarding circumcised versus uncircumcised participants.