Talmud - Bava Metzia 49a בבא מציעא מ״ט א׳

If that half is canceled as well, then why does he need the collateral that he is holding? The lender clearly took the collateral to enable him to collect at least part of his debt after the Sabbatical Year. Rather, do we not conclude from it: What is the meaning of the statement: The Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the loan, that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is saying? It means that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the entire loan. And what is the meaning of: The Sabbatical Year abrogates the loan, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying? It is referring to that half of the loan that he did not take on the basis of collateral.

And they disagree with regard to this: As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a down payment effects acquisition of merchandise commensurate with the entire amount of the transaction, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that a down payment effects acquisition of merchandise commensurate with its value. Apparently, the amoraic dispute parallels the tannaitic dispute.

The Gemara rejects that parallel: No, what is the meaning of the statement: The Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the loan, that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is saying? It is referring to that half of the loan that he took on the basis of collateral. This indicates by inference that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: The Sabbatical Year also abrogates that half of the loan that he took on the basis of collateral. The Gemara asks: Then why does he need the collateral that he is holding? The Gemara answers: He requires it as a mere reminder to increase the likelihood that the loan will be repaid, and it does not prevent cancellation of a loan.

§ The Gemara relates: Buyers gave money to Rav Kahana to purchase linen. Ultimately, the price of linen increased. Rav Kahana came before Rav to ask his opinion. Rav said to him: Give them a quantity of linen equivalent in value to the money that you received, and concerning the rest, your verbal commitment is merely a statement, and reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition does not constitute an act of bad faith.

The Gemara comments: This is as it was stated: There is an amoraic dispute with regard to reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition. Rav says: It does not constitute an act of bad faith. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It constitutes an act of bad faith.

The Gemara raises an objection: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: What is the meaning when the verse states: “A just ephah, and a just hin, shall you have” (Leviticus 19:36)? But wasn’t a hin included in an ephah? Why is it necessary to state both? Rather, this is an allusion that serves to say to you that your yes [hen] should be just, and your no should be just. Apparently, it is a mitzva for one to fulfill his promises. Abaye says: That verse means that one should not say one matter with his mouth and think one other matter in his heart. It is prohibited for one to make a commitment that he has no intention of fulfilling. Rav Kahana made his commitment in good faith and reneged due to changed circumstances. That is not prohibited.

The Gemara raises an objection. Rabbi Shimon says: Even though the Sages said that when one party takes possession of a garment, the other party acquires a gold dinar, but when one party takes possession of a gold dinar, the other party does not acquire a garment, in any case, that is what the halakha would be. But the Sages said with regard to one who reneges on a transaction where one party pulled the gold dinar into his possession: He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the people of the generation of the dispersion, and from the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians in the Red Sea, will in the future exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement. And one who negotiates, where the negotiation culminates with a statement in which he commits himself to acquire the item, did not acquire the item without a formal act of acquisition. But with regard to one who reneges on his commitment, the Sages are displeased with him. Apparently, one who reneges is considered to have acted in bad faith.

The Gemara explains: This matter is a dispute between tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 83a): There was an incident involving Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya, who said to his son: Go out and hire laborers for us. His son went and allocated sustenance for them, as part of their employment terms, without specifying the type of sustenance. And when he came to his father, his father said to him: My son, even if you prepare for them a meal like the feast of Solomon during his era, you will not fulfill your obligation to them, as they are the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and due to that status they are deserving of any meal that they want. Rather, this is what you should do: Before they begin engaging in their labor, go out and say to them: Your employment is on the condition that you have the right to claim from me only the customary meal of bread and legumes.

The Gemara asks: And if it enters your mind that reneging on a verbal commitment unaccompanied by an act of acquisition constitutes an act of bad faith, how did Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya tell his son to renege? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; it is different there in that case, as the laborers themselves do not rely on the son. What is the reason they do not rely on the son? It is due to the fact that they know that he relied on his father giving his approval when committing to feed them.

The Gemara asks: If so, then even if the laborers began engaging in their labor, they still would not rely on the son. Why then did his father instruct him specifically to tell them of the change before they began their labor? The Gemara answers: Once they began engaging in their labor they would certainly rely on the son’s commitment, as they would say: He must have come before his father and stated the conditions of their employment, and his father is amenable to those terms. Therefore, it was necessary to inform them before they began working.

The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan say this, i.e., that one who reneges on a verbal commitment acted in bad faith? But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who says to another: I am giving you a gift, is able to renege on his commitment? The Gemara asks: He is able to renege? It is obvious that he is able to renege, as in the absence of an act of acquisition no one can compel him to give the gift. Rather, it means: It is permitted for him to renege on his commitment. Apparently, one who reneges on a verbal guarantee is not considered to have acted in bad faith. Rav Pappa said: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes that in the case of a small gift one may not renege, as the recipients rely on him to fulfill his verbal commitment. By contrast, in the case of a large gift the recipients are aware that one might reconsider, and therefore they do not rely on his statement and do not assume that his decision is final.

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to an Israelite who said to a Levite: You have a kor of first-tithe produce that is in my possession and that I separated from my produce, the Levite may render all or part of this kor teruma of the tithe for first-tithe produce that he has in another place. Granted, if you say that one is unable, i.e., it is not permitted for him, to renege, it is due to that reason that the Levite may render it teruma of the tithe for other produce. But if you say that one is able, i.e., it is permitted for him, to renege, why may he render it teruma of the tithe for other produce? The owner of the produce could renege, and in that case it will eventuate that he is consuming untithed produce, as the teruma of the tithe that he separated did not belong to him.

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the Levite took the first-tithe produce from him and then deposited it with him, so that it already belongs to the Levite.

The Gemara asks: If so, that this is the circumstance addressed in the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, say the latter clause of that halakha: If the owner of the produce gave the first-tithe produce to a different Levite, the first Levite has only a grievance against the owner, but not any legal claim. And if it enters your mind that this is a case where the first Levite took the first-tithe produce from the owner and then deposited it with him, why does the Levite have only a grievance against him? Once the first Levite pulled the produce into his possession it is his, and therefore, he has property in the possession of the owner of the produce. Rather, must one not conclude from it that this is a case where the Levite did not take the produce and deposit it? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that there was only a verbal commitment, and that proves that reneging on a verbal commitment constitutes an act of bad faith.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who gave money as payment for sesame. Ultimately, the price of sesame increased, and the sellers reneged and said to him: We have no sesame; take your money. The buyer did not take his money, and the money was stolen. They came before Rava to adjudicate the case. Rava said to the buyer: Once they said to you: Take your money, and you did not take it, it is not necessary to say that their legal status is not that of a paid bailee. But my ruling is that their legal status is not even that of an unpaid bailee. The Sages said to Rava: But aren’t the sellers who reneged required to accept upon themselves the curse: He Who exacted payment? Rava said to them: Indeed, they must pay or accept the curse.

Rav Pappi said that Ravina said to me: One of the Sages, and Rav Tavot is his name, and some say Rav Shmuel bar Zutra is his name, and he is one who even if they were to give him the entire expanse of the world he would not deviate from the truth in his speech, said to me: There was an incident in which I was involved. On that day, it was twilight on Shabbat eve, and I was sitting, and a certain man came and stood at the entrance. He said to me: Do you have sesame to sell?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaMetzia 49a explores whether the Sabbatical Year cancels loans secured by collateral, then examines Rav Kahana's linen purchase dispute over verbal commitments.