Talmud - Bava Metzia 32a בבא מציעא ל״ב א׳

two of the three of them to testify that you dissolved the partnership before them. Or alternatively, bring two witnesses to testify that you dissolved the partnership before a court of three.

Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: From where do you know this halakha, that dissolution of the partnership may be accomplished only before a court? Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: It is as we learned in the mishna: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. But if there is no court there, before whom can he stipulate his condition? Rather, in that case, his financial interests take precedence, and he need not return the lost item. Apparently, one stipulates binding conditions with regard to another’s property only before a court.

Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: Is that case in the mishna comparable to this case? There, where he is removing property from the possession of this person and giving it to that person, we require a court. But here, referring to himself in the third person, he is merely taking his own property, and not the property of any other person. There is no transaction effected here. It is mere disclosure of the matter that he divided the joint property equitably, and two witnesses are sufficient for him to disclose that fact. Rav Safra cites proof. Know that this is so, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 97a) that a widow owed sustenance from her husband’s estate sells the property of the estate when not before a court. Apparently, one need not involve the court when reclaiming property that belongs to him.

Abaye said to him: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The court before which a widow sells the property of the estate need not be a court of experts, but is required to be at least a court of laymen. Therefore, as in the parallel case of the widow, even when disclosing that one took property belonging to him, two witnesses are not sufficient and a court is required.

MISHNA: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it to its owner. If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and a priest found it, he may not become impure to return it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father.

If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta’azov] with him” (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times.

If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, if it is your wish to unload the burden, unload it, in such a case the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him,” with the owner of the animal. If the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact he was old or infirm, the passerby is obligated to unload the burden alone.

There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. Rabbi Shimon says: There is even a mitzva to load the burden.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden,” i.e., the obligation is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one found an animal in a stable, he need not return it to its owner. Rava said: The stable that the Sages mentioned in the mishna is one that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal so it will not flee. The Gemara explains Rava’s statement. That it does not encourage the animal to stray is learned from the fact that the tanna teaches: He is not obligated in its return. The fact that it does not secure the animal is learned from the fact that it was necessary for the tanna to teach: He is not obligated in its return.

The Gemara continues its explanation of Rava’s statement: As, if it enters your mind to say that it is a stable that secures the animal, that ruling would be extraneous. Now that in a case where one found the animal outside a stable he brings it inside a stable of that type and thereby returns the animal to its owner, in a case where he found the animal inside the stable is it necessary to teach that he is not obligated to return it to its owner? Rather, learn from it that the stable mentioned in the mishna does not secure the animal and therefore there is a possibility that one must return it. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that it is a stable that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal.

§ The mishna teaches: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing within the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that if the animal was found in a public area he is obligated to return it, and even if it was within the city limits, he is also obligated to return it.

There are those who teach this statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing beyond the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that in a case where the animal was found in the stable, even if the animal is standing beyond the city limits, he is also not obligated in its return.

§ The mishna teaches: And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and was found by a priest, he may not become impure to return it. In a case where a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: From where is it derived that if a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or that if one’s father said to him: Do not return a lost item that you found; he should not listen to him? It is derived from the verse, as it is stated: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:3). From the fact that the verse concludes: “I am the Lord,” it is derived that: You are all, parent and child alike, obligated in My honor. Therefore, if a parent commands his child to refrain from observing a mitzva, he must not obey the command.

The Gemara infers: The reason that a priest must not obey his father’s command to become impure is because the Merciful One writes: “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord”; but if it were not so, I would say that the child must obey him. The Gemara asks: But why? This obligation to obey a parent is a positive mitzva, as it is written: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and that obligation of a priest to refrain from becoming impure is both a prohibition: “To the dead among his people he shall not defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 19:2); and the principle is that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva.

The Gemara answers that the derivation from “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since honoring one’s father and mother is equated to the honor of the Omnipresent, as it is stated here: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and it is stated elsewhere: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), therefore, one might have thought that the priest must obey his father’s command to become impure. Therefore the Torah teaches us that the priest is commanded not to listen to him.

§ The mishna teaches: There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But there is no mitzva to load it? If we say that it means: But there is no mitzva to load it at all; what is different about unloading, with regard to which it is written: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5)? With regard to loading as well, isn’t it written: “You shall lift them with him” (Deuteronomy 22:4)?

The Gemara answers: Rather, there is a mitzva by Torah law to unload the burden for free, but there is no mitzva to load it for free; rather, the mitzva is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon says: There is also a mitzva to load it for free. The Gemara states: We learn by inference from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: Unloading is performed for free, and loading is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon said: Both this and that are performed for free.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that there is a distinction between unloading and loading with regard to remuneration? The reason is that if it enters your mind that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let the Merciful One write only the mitzva of loading, and then He would need not write the mitzva of unloading, and I would say: Just as with regard to loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss for the owner, one is obligated to load the burden, with regard to unloading, where there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss for the owner, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden? Rather, with regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write the mitzva of unloading? It is to tell you: The mitzva of unloading the burden is performed for free, but the mitzva of loading is performed with remuneration.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that even loading is performed for free, what is the reason that the Torah writes the mitzva of unloading? The Gemara answers: It is because the verses are not clearly defined, and it is unclear which of the verses refers to loading and which refers to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted with regard to unloading, and there would be no source that one needs to load an animal.

And the Rabbis could ask: Why does Rabbi Shimon say that the verses are not clearly defined? Here it is written: “Collapsed under its burden” (Exodus 23:5), clearly referring to the case of a burden that needs unloading, and there it is written: “Fallen down by the way” (Deuteronomy 22:4), indicating that both the animals and their burdens are lying on the way and are in need of loading. And Rabbi Shimon explains that the verses are not defined because the phrase “fallen down by the way” could be understood as indicating that the animals are fallen with their burdens upon them, and referring to unloading.

Rava says:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaMetzia 32a explores whether dissolving a partnership or reclaiming personal property requires formal court validation or merely witness confirmation.